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THEORIZING FORMS FOR SOCIAL ENTERPRISE 
Dana Brakman Reiser∗ 
Jurisdictions across the country and around the globe are enacting 
legislation enabling founders of social enterprises to adopt specialized forms 
to house their entities. These forms blend elements traditionally found in 
nonprofit organizational forms, such as commitment to a social mission, with 
elements from for-profit business structures, such as the ability to attract 
investors. These legal forms appear to offer founders and investors the ability 
to “do well by doing good” and give consumers and employees access to 
“companies with a soul.” These aspirations, however, have not yet been fully 
realized by any of the specialized forms currently available. In other work, I 
have described and critiqued the specifics of the various new forms, both here 
and abroad. This Article takes a step back, and examines the broader 
theoretical question of what specialized forms would have to provide in order 
for them to help social enterprise to realize its claimed potential. 
INTRODUCTION 
Social enterprise is a hotly contested term. For present purposes, though, a 
general idea will suffice. By social enterprise, I mean an organization formed 
to achieve social goals using business methods. Think companies that use one-
for-one models1 like TOMS shoes2 and Warby Parker,3 or employ “hard-to-
 
 ∗ Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. I greatly appreciate the support of Brooklyn Law School’s 
summer research stipend program, the research assistance of Joseph Binder, and the comments and 
suggestions of Fred Bloom, Steven Dean, Lyman Johnson, Rob Katz, Claire Kelly, Melanie Leslie, Jeff Reiser, 
Adam Zimmerman, and the panelists and participants at the Emory Law Journal Randolph W. Thrower 
Symposium on “Innovation for the Modern Era: Law, Policy, and Practice in a Changing World.” Versions of 
this project were also presented at a Brooklyn Law School Faculty Workshop and at the 2012 Annual Meeting 
program of the AALS Section on Agency, Partnership, LLC’s and Unincorporated Associations, and I thank 
those who participated for their insights. Any remaining errors are, of course, my own. 
 1 Companies with a one-for-one model typically produce consumer goods and “for every unit of a 
product sold, the company donates one similar or related item to people in need.” Alisen Downey, A One-for-
One Revolution, E MAG., Nov./Dec. 2011, at 40, 40 (describing various companies using the model). 
 2 TOMS, http://www.toms.com/ (last visited May 10, 2013) (“With every pair you purchase, TOMS will 
give a pair of new shoes to a child in need.”). 
 3 Do Good, WARBY PARKER, http://www.warbyparker.com/do-good/#home (last visited May 10, 2013) 
(“For every pair of glasses we sell, we provide a pair to someone in need.”). 
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employ,” low-income, or foreign-born individuals like Greyston Bakery4 and 
Hot Bread Kitchen.5 Think of your favorite green or locally sourced business 
or of one serving customers at the bottom of the pyramid.6 Founders, 
proponents, and evangelists of social enterprise, sometimes called social 
entrepreneurs, have big aspirations for it. 
Enthusiasts argue social enterprises will have a more positive and 
sustainable impact on people and planet than ordinary for-profit businesses.7 
They claim social enterprises can do more good for more people than 
traditional nonprofits because their financing and business methods make them 
more efficient, effective, and scalable.8 These advocates see social enterprises 
 
 4 The Greyston Bakery’s Guiding Principles, GREYSTON BAKERY, http://www.greystonbakery.com/wp-
content/uploads/pdf/greyston-bakery-guiding-principles.pdf (last visited May 10, 2013) (stating its dual 
commitments to “consistently achieve an operating profit” and to “continue its open-hiring policy, and the 
associated apprenticeship program, in order to provide opportunity to [inner-city] Yonkers’[s] hard-to-employ 
population”).  
 5 Our Mission, HOT BREAD KITCHEN, http://hotbreadkitchen.org/about-us/our-mission (last visited May 
10, 2013) (describing its mission to “increase[] economic security for foreign-born and low-income women 
and men by opening access to the billion dollar specialty food industry . . . [through its] culinary workforce 
and business incubation programs” and its sale of “delicious multi-ethnic breads”). 
 6 See C.K. PRAHALAD, THE FORTUNE AT THE BOTTOM OF THE PYRAMID: ERADICATING POVERTY 
THROUGH PROFITS 4 (2005) (describing the “bottom of the pyramid” as the more than four billion individuals 
with the lowest purchasing power parity worldwide); see also, e.g., Nicole Wallace, Opportunity International 
Spins Off Insurance Company, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY (Jan. 17, 2013, 9:17 AM), http://philanthropy.com/ 
blogs/innovation/opportunity-international-spins-off-insurance-company/1653 (featuring MicroEnsure, a 
nonprofit transitioning to for-profit status in order to scale its venture in selling low-cost insurance to “people 
in the developing world [who] are one failed crop, one illness, or one emergency away from financial ruin”). 
 7 J. Gregory Dees & Beth Battle Anderson, For-Profit Social Ventures, in SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
1, 5–6 (Marilyn L. Kourilsky & William B. Walstad eds., 2003). 
 8 See, e.g., Charles R. Bronfman & Jeffrey R. Solomon, Should Philanthropies Operate like Businesses? 
Yes: Good Intentions Aren’t Enough, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 2011, at R1 (“[T]o have a sustained and strategic 
impact, philanthropy must be conducted like business—with discipline, strategy and a strong focus on 
outcomes.”); Dan Pallotta, Why Can’t We Sell Charity like We Sell Perfume?, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 2012, at 
C1 (“If we free the nonprofit sector to hire the best talent in the world, take fundraising risks, use marketing to 
build demand and invest capital for new revenue-generating efforts, we could bring private ingenuity to bear 
on [the world’s] problems and would not need to look to government to fill the gaps.” (emphasis added)).  
Of course, there are also critics of the social enterprise trend. See, e.g., Phil Buchanan, Charities Should 
Resist Drinking the “Kool-Aid” of Business Superiority, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Sept. 20, 2012, at 56 (“[T]he 
rush to embrace the idea that for-profits can more easily combat our toughest social problems denies the reality 
that many crucial objectives simply cannot be accomplished while generating a financial return.”); Michael 
Edwards, Should Philanthropies Operate like Businesses? No, the Poorest Will Suffer, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 
2011, at R1 (“[T]he colonization of philanthropy by business could turn it into a much more conservative force 
and limit its potential to get at the really difficult problems.”). 
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as a different and exciting new way forward, but they lambast one very 
improbable obstacle: legal form.9 
Under this view, traditional for-profit and nonprofit legal forms frustrate 
social entrepreneurs’ bold new vision for achieving social change.10 The 
backward, old law forces a founder to choose between two equally inadequate 
categories. If she forms a for-profit, particularly a for-profit corporation, 
shareholder primacy will force her to single-mindedly focus on profit, with no 
way to protect the social mission of the entity or its founders. If she forms a 
nonprofit, this social vision can be protected, but business strategies, especially 
equity capital, are foreclosed. These mutually exclusive legal categories, the 
story goes, prevent social enterprises from pursuing mutually reinforcing 
commitments to profit and social good—and shortchange us all in the process. 
Across the country and around the globe, jurisdictions have begun to 
respond to these claims by offering a variety of specialized legal forms 
intended to house social enterprises. Thus far, these include the low-profit 
limited liability company, the benefit corporation, the benefit LLC, the flexible 
purpose corporation, and the social-purpose corporation.11 More will likely 
proliferate. Much legal scholarship in this fledgling area, including my own, 
has focused on understanding and critiquing the specifics of these enactments 
and proposals.12 This Article does something new. It begins to theorize 
whether and how any legal form can do the work desired by social enterprise 
founders. 
This work falls along three principal dimensions: permitting, achieving, 
and branding the difference of social enterprises. Social entrepreneurs begin 
with their desire to blend their profit-making and social missions in a single 
 
 9 See, e.g., Julie Battilana et al., In Search of the Hybrid Ideal, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV., Summer 
2012, at 51, 52 (describing the “confusing dilemma” facing social entrepreneurs confronted with only pure for-
profit and nonprofit organizational forms); William H. Clark, Jr. & Elizabeth K. Babson, How Benefit 
Corporations Are Redefining the Purpose of Business Corporations, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 817, 851 
(2012) (“The sustainable business movement, impact investing, and social enterprise sectors are developing 
rapidly, but are constrained by an outdated legal framework that is not equipped to accommodate for-profit 
entities whose social benefit purpose is central to their existence.”); Thomas Kelley, Law and Choice of Entity 
on the Social Enterprise Frontier, 84 TUL. L. REV. 337, 363–64 (2009); Heerad Sabeti, The For-Benefit 
Enterprise, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov. 2011, at 99, 99 (lamenting that “socially minded entrepreneurs end up 
shoehorning their vision into one structure or the other and accepting burdensome trade-offs in the process”).  
 10 Battilana et al., supra note 9, at 52. 
 11 See Stephanie Strom, A Quest for Hybrid Companies That Profit, but Can Tap Charity, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 13, 2011, at B1. As this Article goes to press, Delaware is moving toward adoption of its own specialized 
form, the “public benefit corporation.” 
 12 See, e.g., infra notes 35, 39, 43 (L3Cs, benefit corporations, and FPCs, respectively).  
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entity. They believe in the unique ability of social enterprise to solve social 
problems and return profits to owners. Rather than hiding these dual 
aspirations behind a veneer of “business as usual” or under a halo of 
selflessness, these founders want to claim their social enterprises’ blended 
missions explicitly. For a specialized legal form to succeed, it must permit 
social entrepreneurs to embrace this different ideal. 
Blended value, however, could easily remain purely aspirational. After all, 
pursuing profit and social good will not always lead in the same direction. 
Sometimes, perhaps often, they can be mutually reinforcing, especially if one 
takes the long view. For example, imagine that a social enterprise furniture 
manufacturer locates its factory in an economically depressed area, employing 
the formerly jobless and investing in the community. Its dedication draws 
skilled craftsmen to the area and their creations become darlings of the design 
world. The business endures and the reinvigorated town thrives. 
But not every story will have an easy route to such a happy ending. Perhaps 
the skilled craftsmen need to be wooed to the town with high salaries, while 
frustrated local workers toil for a subsistence wage. Even if the stars align at 
the outset, eventually there will have to be decisions where profit and social 
good come into conflict and must be traded off. Perhaps this social enterprise 
will design the new “it” chair and make millions. Still, its managers will need 
to decide what portion of each dollar of earnings to donate to the community, 
or to invest in modernizing the plant, or to return to investors, without whom 
none of this would have happened. They will need to set prices, choose 
suppliers, hire, and fire. Social entrepreneurs say they will make these 
decisions in a way different than traditional for-profit or nonprofit entities. But, 
for adoption of a specialized legal form to indicate that an entity actually is 
different, it must impose a new and unambiguous baseline standard and 
provide for its reliable enforcement. 
Only by doing so can a specialized legal form reach the ultimate goal of 
social entrepreneurs who seek them: to become a brand. Social entrepreneurs 
want to convey to investors that their entities will provide a different and better 
overall return—doing more for investors’ pocketbooks than a charitable 
donation and more for their souls than an ordinary stock or bond. Furthermore, 
social entrepreneurs also want to reach consumers, employees, partners, and 
the public with positive messages about their different and better companies. A 
specialized legal form that serves as an effective brand will help social 
entrepreneurs to communicate these points. 
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The rest of this Article proceeds in four parts. Part I demonstrates that there 
are many ways a specialized form can permit social entrepreneurs to pursue 
both social good and profit. Part II, however, explains that for a specialized 
form to succeed it must challenge the idyllic version of the social enterprise, 
demanding realism and specificity about an entity’s goals and the priority 
among them. This Part urges lawmakers to adopt a clear standard requiring 
entities adopting specialized forms to prioritize social good. It then explores 
various legal avenues for doing so. Part III canvasses the mechanisms that 
might be used to enforce such a standard. It might be policed from within or 
outside the entity, publicly or privately, and each enforcement mechanism 
comes with its own unique challenges. Finally, Part IV addresses the capacity 
of specialized legal forms to serve as brands. If a specialized form imposes a 
clear standard and creates viable enforcement mechanisms, it can communicate 
that its adopters are meaningfully different from for-profit or nonprofit 
competitors. This achievement would deliver considerable branding value to 
social enterprise, but it would still not convey all of the positive messages 
social entrepreneurs wish to transmit. 
I. PERMITTING DIFFERENCE 
One of the most basic things social entrepreneurs seek in a specialized legal 
form is safe space to declare that their entities are committed to a new and 
different goal—pursuing both profit and social good. The simple expression of 
this commitment is transgressive in traditional nonprofit legal entities. It is at 
best fraught, and at worst unlawful, in traditional for-profit ones. This Part 
explains why. It also introduces three types of specialized forms for social 
enterprise now available in the United States and explains how each creates an 
entity based on express permission to pursue blended missions. 
A. Traditional Forms’ Problems 
Nonprofits can be formed as nonprofit corporations or charitable trusts, and 
both impose a strong “nondistribution constraint”13 utterly incompatible with a 
hybrid mission. With very limited exceptions, a nonprofit corporation simply 
“shall not make any distributions.”14 A distribution is defined as a “payment of 
 
 13 See Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 838 (1980) (“A 
nonprofit organization is, in essence, an organization that is barred from distributing its net earnings, if any, to 
individuals who exercise control over it, such as members, officers, directors, or trustees.”). 
 14 REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 13.01 (1987). Similar prohibitions on distributions are 
likewise imposed by federal tax law upon nonprofits exempt from income taxation and eligible to receive tax-
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a dividend or any part of the income or profit of a corporation to its members, 
directors or officers.”15 For charitable trusts, a similarly stark rule obtains: “A 
trust is not a charitable trust if the property or the income therefrom is to be 
devoted to a private use.”16 A charitable trust does not lose this designation 
“merely because its operation results in a profit,” but if its profits are “applied 
to private purposes . . . the trust ceases to be charitable.”17 Although nonprofit 
organizations can pay their employees reasonable compensation, it is 
absolutely off-limits for them to provide a share of net profits to founders as a 
return on their investment.18 Nonprofits are similarly barred from soliciting 
equity capital from others.19 Thus, a social enterprise taking a nonprofit legal 
form cannot expressly commit to pursuing both social good and profits for 
owners. 
Nor do social entrepreneurs perceive traditional for-profit forms as 
particularly hospitable. This perception stems in part from a debate about 
corporate law. Many legal scholars argue that owner wealth maximization need 
not be the sole or exclusive goal of a for-profit corporation.20 Indeed, the 
American Law Institute suggests a dual-mission, for-profit corporation would 
 
deductible contributions. See I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(3), 170(c) (2006) (stating eligibility criteria for such 
organizations, including that “no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private 
shareholder or individual”). 
 15 REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 1.40 (1987). 
 16 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 376 (1959); accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 
cmt. a (2003) (commenting in the reporter’s notes that this language in the prior Restatement “is worth 
recalling”). 
 17 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 376 cmt. d (1959); accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS 
§ 28 cmt. a(1) (2003) (explaining that a charitable trust may provide services on a fee-paid basis without 
risking its charitable status, so long as it “does not seek to make a profit to benefit its shareholders or otherwise 
to serve a noncharitable purpose”). 
 18 See, e.g., REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT §§ 1.40, 13.01 (1987). 
 19 See Clara Miller, The Equity Capital Gap, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV., Summer 2008, at 41, 42–43 
(noting that nonprofits suffer due to an inability to raise equity capital). 
 20 See, e.g., LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST 
HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 25–31 (2012); Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate 
Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 738–47 (2005); Judd F. Sneirson, Green Is Good: 
Sustainability, Profitability, and a New Paradigm for Corporate Governance, 94 IOWA L. REV. 987, 996–1007 
(2009); see also Lyman Johnson, Pluralism in Corporate Form: Corporate Law and Benefit Corporations, 25 
REGENT U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 40), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=2177049 (critiquing “the unresolved muddle in corporate law doctrine and theory concerning 
the inter-relationship among corporate purpose, a corporation’s best interests, and fiduciary duties” and 
arguing that benefit corporation statutes partly, but not fully, illuminate it); Mark A. Underberg, Benefit 
Corporations vs. “Regular” Corporations: A Harmful Dichotomy, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE 
& FIN. REG. (May 13, 2012, 8:31 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/05/13/benefit-corporations-
vs-regular-corporations-a-harmful-dichotomy/ (advocating a similar view and warning of the dangerous 
implications of specialized forms for the ability of traditional for-profits to pursue nonshareholder interests). 
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be unproblematic, so long as its owners agreed.21 Others are less sanguine 
about the place of goals other than enhancing shareholder value within for-
profit corporations, accepting a strong shareholder wealth maximization 
norm.22 Even among this norm’s most strident proponents, however, there is 
wide recognition that outside of the takeover context, the business judgment 
rule will shelter corporate directors from liability for virtually all operational 
decisions.23 In states with constituency statutes, such decisions will be 
protected even in response to a takeover threat.24 Thus, directors appear to 
 
 21 See 1 AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
§ 2.01, at 73 n.6 (1994) (“[T]here is little doubt that [restrictions on the general profit-making objective] would 
normally be permissible if agreed to by all the shareholders. Such an agreement might be embodied in the 
certificate of incorporation, or not.”). 
 22 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply 
to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423, 1424–25 (1993) (noting that “[a]t least in Delaware, the 
shareholder wealth maximization norm thus remains a more accurate description of the state of the law than 
any of its competitors” and embracing that norm) [hereinafter Bainbridge, In Defense]; Henry Hansmann & 
Reinier Kraakman, Essay, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 441 (2001) (asserting that 
“there is today a broad normative consensus that shareholders alone are the parties to whom corporate 
managers should be accountable”); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Essay, Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea That For-
Profit Corporations Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 155 (2012) (opining that “corporate law 
requires directors, as a matter of their duty of loyalty, to pursue a good faith strategy to maximize profits for 
the stockholders”); see also KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW 41–42 (2006) (describing 
shareholder primacy as a “foundational principle” that “informs every aspect of corporate and securities law” 
in a work arguing corporate law should embrace a broader sense of proper corporate purposes). Although 
Professor Bainbridge remains committed to the shareholder wealth maximization norm, he has recently argued 
the debate about corporate purpose is futile. See Stephen Bainbridge, The Vacuity of Corporate Purpose, 
PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (May 05, 2012, 10:47 AM), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/ 
professorbainbridgecom/2012/05/the-vacuity-of-corporate-purpose.html [hereinafter Bainbridge, Vacuity]. 
 23 See Bainbridge, In Defense, supra note 22, at 1439 (opining that “the business judgment rule will 
insulate directors from liability without regard to the shareholder wealth consequences of the board’s decision 
in the vast majority of cases”). Other scholars who challenge a strong shareholder wealth maximization norm 
have made similar observations. See Miriam A. Cherry & Judd F. Sneirson, Beyond Profit: Rethinking 
Corporate Social Responsibility and Greenwashing After the BP Oil Disaster, 85 TUL. L. REV. 983, 1022 
(2011) (“[E]ven if one accepts the view that corporate law requires fiduciaries to focus on shareholder wealth, 
the business judgment rule affords corporate decision makers so much latitude as to render any such duty 
unenforceable and meaningless.”); Antony Page & Robert A. Katz, Freezing Out Ben & Jerry: Corporate Law 
and the Sale of a Social Enterprise Icon, 35 VT. L. REV. 211, 232 (2010) (“Under the business judgment rule, 
courts will almost invariably defer to the directors’ judgment. As long as a course of action may lead to some 
potential benefit to shareholders, even in the far distant future, the directors’ decisions will survive judicial 
review.” (footnote omitted)). 
 24 John Tyler, Negating the Legal Problem of Having “Two Masters”: A Framework for L3C Fiduciary 
Duties and Accountability, 35 VT. L. REV. 117, 132 (2010) (explaining that “constituency statutes formally 
allow corporate directors to consider the interests of some combination of non-shareholder[]” constituencies in 
the takeover context, and sometimes more broadly); see also Lisa M. Fairfax, Doing Well While Doing Good: 
Reassessing the Scope of Directors’ Fiduciary Obligations in For-Profit Corporations with Non-Shareholder 
Beneficiaries, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 409, 460–61 (2002) (offering a similar description); Eric W. Orts, 
Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 14, 27–29 (1992) 
(same).  
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have little to fear from decisions that will not strictly, and in the short term, 
pursue maximum value for shareholders. 
One could take this narrow gap between scholars on either side of the 
question as close enough to consensus that a for-profit corporation could 
effectively house a social enterprise. Yet, various practical impediments 
remain. For example, anecdotal reports explain that one reason for initiating 
specialized-form legislation has been the unwillingness of a secretary of state’s 
office to accept articles of incorporation from for-profit corporations that 
evinced a blended mission.25 Corporate directors themselves also may embrace 
and comply with a strong shareholder primacy norm regardless of the positions 
of corporate law scholars.26 They may do so not entirely out of misplaced fears 
of legal repercussions; vulnerability to takeover attempts or fears that investors 
will lose confidence can make it risky for for-profit entities to articulate a dual 
mission. 
Of course, the risk of liability to shareholders all but disappears in small, 
closely held corporations. If directors and shareholders are the same 
individuals, there is little threat of suit. Shareholders in such corporations can 
also contract around many of these issues in a carefully drafted shareholders’ 
agreement. Moreover, incorporation is hardly the only option for those seeking 
a for-profit form. Partnership and LLC forms are known for their flexibility, 
and their governance can be largely and idiosyncratically structured by 
partnership or operating agreements. These contracts can provide social 
entrepreneurs with a venue to express their entities’ commitment to profit and 
 
 25 See Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations—A Sustainable Form of Organization?, 46 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 591, 592, 608 (2011). 
 26 Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization, 149 U. PA. L. 
REV. 2063, 2073 (2001) (noting that “[n]orms in American business circles, starting with business school 
education, emphasize the value, appropriateness, and indeed the justice of maximizing shareholder wealth”); 
Stephen Bainbridge, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (May 5, 
2012, 12:51 PM), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2012/05/the-shareholder-
wealth-maximization-norm.html (citing surveys of directors reporting their prioritization of shareholder 
interests). But see D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 290–91 (1998); 
Sneirson, supra note 20, at 1011–12 (arguing businesspersons have more complex views on corporate 
objectives). A detailed empirical study of directors’ views on this question can be found in JAY W. LORSCH 
WITH ELIZABETH MACIVER, PAWNS OR POTENTATES: THE REALITY OF AMERICA’S CORPORATE BOARDS 37–54 
(1989), which found that corporate directors “believe the shareholders are their most important constituents 
when reaching decisions,” but they view their role to more appropriately include a broader focus. These 
findings are also discussed in Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Critical Look at Corporate Governance, 45 VAND. L. 
REV. 1263, 1292–94 (1992). 
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social good.27 Fiduciaries in partnerships and LLCs that do so should have 
little to fear from owners who opt into them despite clear notice of these dual 
commitments. 
Still, social entrepreneurs might not see closely held corporations, LLCs, or 
partnerships as sufficient solutions.28 The most ambitious worry about scale;29 
incorporation has long been seen as a stop along the path to largeness, if not to 
greatness. For founders with lofty (some might say unrealistic) goals for their 
enterprises’ success, these forms will soon become overly constraining. At the 
other extreme are concerns about access. For those without counsel, let alone 
ambitions of publicly traded shares, highly adjustable forms may be difficult to 
manage. Small and legally unsophisticated founders will have neither expertise 
nor counsel to engage in complex contract drafting. Instead, they will want an 
off-the-rack legal form for dual-mission entities.30 
B. Specialized Forms’ Solutions 
The low-profit limited liability company (L3C), benefit corporation, and 
flexible purpose corporation (FPC) are designed to fill this need. These 
specialized forms, now available in one-third of U.S. jurisdictions,31 provide a 
 
 27 See Daniel S. Kleinberger, A Myth Deconstructed: The “Emperor’s New Clothes” on the Low-Profit 
Limited Liability Company, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 879, 896–97 (2010) (arguing that ordinary LLCs are quite 
capable of housing businesses committed to social good); see also J. William Callison & Allan W. Vestal, The 
L3C Illusion: Why Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies Will Not Stimulate Socially Optimal Private 
Foundation Investment in Entrepreneurial Ventures, 35 VT. L. REV. 273, 286–88 (2010) (explaining the 
difficulty of drafting an LLC operating agreement to resolve the tensions between profit and social-good goals, 
but arguing they would be the same for an LLC or L3C). 
 28 General partnership, of course, raises the additional concern of personal liability for owners. See, e.g., 
REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 306(a) (1997). 
 29 JOHN ELKINGTON & PAMELA HARTIGAN, THE POWER OF UNREASONABLE PEOPLE 179–96 (2008) 
(discussing the challenges of “scaling” up); Michael Chertok et al., The Funding Gap, STAN. SOC. 
INNOVATION REV., Spring 2008, at 44, 46 (“One of the reasons social enterprises have trouble raising money is 
that they do not fit neatly into either the traditional nonprofit or for-profit model.”); J. Gregory Dees et al., 
Scaling Social Impact: Strategies for Spreading Social Innovations, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV., Spring 
2004, at 24 (advising social entrepreneurs on the ways to overcome their challenges in increasing their scale). 
 30 See Sabeti, supra note 9, at 99 (arguing more social enterprises would exist if they could adopt “a 
legally recognized organizational structure”); Kyle Westaway, New Legal Structures for “Social 
Entrepreneurs,” WALL ST. J. (Dec. 12, 2011, 12:42 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203 
413304577088604063391944.html (touting the benefits of affordable new specialized legal forms available to 
social entrepreneurs). 
 31 See Laws, AM. FOR COMMUNITY DEV., http://americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/laws.html (last 
visited May 10, 2013) (listing nine states and two Native American tribes with L3C statutes); State by State 
Legislative Status, BENEFIT CORP. INFO. CENTER, http://www.benefitcorp.net/state-by-state-legislative-status 
(last visited May 10, 2013) (listing fifteen states with benefit corporation statutes, two of which also have L3C 
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forum for social entrepreneurs to safely proclaim their blended missions 
proudly. Each does so by starting with an established for-profit legal form and 
adding a social mission component to it. 
The L3C adds charitable or educational purpose requirements to an 
otherwise standard LLC framework. Rather than developing its own definition 
of charitable or educational, L3C statutes import definitions developed under 
the Internal Revenue Code.32 In addition, “[n]o significant purpose” of an L3C 
can be “the production of income or the appreciation of property,”33 although 
producing significant income or capital appreciation will not alone render an 
entity ineligible for L3C status.34 An entity can retain this status as long as its 
purposes remain in line. Importantly, if an L3C ceases to comply, it simply and 
immediately transforms into an ordinary LLC.35 
Benefit corporations are incorporated entities that, along with profits, must 
pursue a “general public benefit.”36 The level of detail benefit corporation 
statutes use in defining general public benefit varies across jurisdictions. 
Uniformly, though, they describe general public benefit as “a material positive 
impact on society and the environment” and “as measured by a third-party 
standard.”37 These third-party standards lie at the heart of the benefit 
 
legislation, and three of which also allow L3Cs). As of this writing, California and Washington are the only 
states to have passed FPC and social-purpose corporation legislation, respectively.  
 32 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 1611(1) (2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27)(A) (West 
Supp. 2012). 
 33 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1302(C)(1)(b) (2013); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27)(B). 
 34 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 57C-2-01(d)(2) (West 2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-29-
102(a)(ix)(B) (West Supp. 2012). In addition, L3Cs may not be formed to “accomplish one or more political or 
legislative purposes,” again as defined by the tax code. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 57C-2-01(d)(2); VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27)(C).  
 35 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 1611(3); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 7-16-76(c) (West Supp. 
2012). Several detailed analyses of the L3C form are available. See Carter G. Bishop, The Low-Profit LLC 
(L3C): Program Related Investment by Proxy or Perversion?, 63 ARK. L. REV. 243 (2010); Dana Brakman 
Reiser, Governing and Financing Blended Enterprise, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 619, 620–30 (2010); Kleinberger, 
supra note 27, at 896–97; J. Haskell Murray & Edward I. Hwang, Purpose with Profit: Governance, 
Enforcement, Capital-Raising and Capital-Locking in Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies, 66 U. MIAMI 
L. REV. 1, 22–23 (2011).  
 36 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 14610(a) (West 2013); see also MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-
6C-01(c) (West Supp. 2012). An intriguing model for benefit corporation legislation, drafted by proponents, is 
available online. Model Benefit Corporation Legislation, BENEFIT CORP. INFO. CENTER (Jan. 26, 2012), 
http://benefitcorp.org/storage/Model_Legislation.pdf. This Article, however, will instead cite legislation as 
actually adopted by various jurisdictions as examples.  
 37 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D-2 (2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-782 (West Supp. 2012). 
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corporation concept.38 Enabling legislation requires benefit corporations to 
frame their public benefit aspirations with respect to a standard developed by a 
transparent, independent entity.39 Benefit corporations also must disclose their 
public benefit achievements to shareholders and the public with reference to 
such a standard.40 
Flexible purpose corporations tweak the for-profit corporate model without 
recourse to third-party standards. Instead, an FPC is “organized . . . for the 
benefit of the long-term and the short-term interests of the flexible purpose 
corporation and its shareholders and in furtherance of [one or more] 
enumerated purposes” its founders select.41 Special purposes may be either 
ones typically pursued by a charity or “promoting positive short-term or long-
term effects of, or minimizing adverse short-term or long-term effects of, the 
flexible purpose corporation’s activities upon any of the following: (i) [t]he 
flexible purpose corporation’s employees, suppliers, customers, and 
creditors[;] (ii) [t]he community and society[;] (iii) [t]he environment.”42 Each 
adopting entity must declare its intention to pursue one or more of these special 
purposes in its articles of incorporation.43 
The first thing social entrepreneurs want from a specialized form is 
permission to expose their enterprises’ dual missions. Traditional nonprofit and 
for-profit forms of organization miss the mark, while all of the various 
specialized forms meet it effectively. Whatever the other problems or 
 
 38 See Brakman Reiser, supra note 25, at 592, 600–03; J. William Callison, Putting New Sheets on a 
Procrustean Bed: How Benefit Corporations Address Fiduciary Duties, the Dangers Created, and Suggestions 
for Change, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 85, 90–92, 94 (2012); J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own Master: Social 
Enterprise, Certifications, and Benefit Corporation Statutes, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 1, 21 (2012). 
 39 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-1 (West Supp. 2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.03(a)(5), (8). 
Importantly, benefit corporations need not submit to assessment by such a third party. Benefit corporations can 
self-assess, but they must use a third party’s metric. For general discussion and critique of the benefit 
corporation form, see Brakman Reiser, supra note 25; Callison, supra note 38; and Murray, supra note 38. 
 40 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1831 (2013); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1708 (McKinney Supp. 
2012). Benefit LLCs likewise rely upon third-party standards, but tweak the LLC, rather than a corporate, 
form. See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 4A-1101(c). 
 41 See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2602(b)(1)(A). 
 42 See id. § 2602(b)(2). 
 43 See id. § 2602(b). Comprehensive discussion of the FPC form can be found in Dana Brakman Reiser, 
The Next Big Thing: Flexible Purpose Corporations, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 55 (2012), and Robert T. 
Esposito, The Social Enterprise Revolution in Corporate Law: A Primer on Hybrid Corporate Entities in 
Europe and the United States and the Case for the Benefit Corporation, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 52–58), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2134022. Washington’s 
social-purpose corporation statute also looks to founders to declare their social mission, without tax law or 
third-party signposts. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23B.25.020–.40 (West Supp. 2013); see also Esposito, 
supra, at 57–61 (analyzing the social-purpose corporation form). 
REISER GALLEYSPROOFS2 6/11/2013 9:20 AM 
692 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:681 
shortcomings of an L3C, benefit corporation, or FPC, each begins with a for-
profit template and requires its adopters to express their commitment to social 
good as well. 
II. ACHIEVING DIFFERENCE 
Making space to articulate a dual mission is the easy part of designing an 
organizational form for social enterprise. Designing a for-profit form that will 
achieve social good is much harder. To succeed, governments must do two 
things: (1) set a standard for what counts as a true dual-mission entity, and (2) 
fashion or enable mechanisms to enforce that standard. This Part and the next 
explain how legislative attempts to date have fallen short on these tasks and 
suggest how future efforts might do better. 
A. A Different Standard: Prioritize Social Good 
A government creating a specialized form for social enterprises must set 
some baseline standard for accessing it. If a specialized form is to constitute a 
separate, third category of organization, it needs some core quality that 
differentiates it from traditional for-profit and nonprofit forms. As will be 
discussed in more detail below, current specialized forms allow adopting 
entities to pursue both profit and social good, but rarely require them to 
prioritize one or the other. This generic command to “do both” insufficiently 
distinguishes specialized forms from ordinary for-profit entities. 
No matter where one falls in the debate over the strength of the shareholder 
wealth maximization norm, for-profit corporations can certainly produce social 
good when it will coincide with producing profits. Legislation in every state 
permits for-profit corporations to make charitable contributions.44 These 
donations, along with far more extensive corporate social responsibility 
programs, have become ubiquitous and go on unchallenged.45 Unincorporated 
for-profit entities offer their founders and managers even greater flexibility to 
pursue social objectives along with business ones. There is plenty of space for 
entities that “do both,” but prioritize profit, under the traditional for-profit 
umbrella.46 If specialized forms are to create a meaningful, separate category 
 
 44 See R. Franklin Balotti & James J. Hanks, Jr., Giving at the Office: A Reappraisal of Charitable 
Contributions by Corporations, 54 BUS. LAW. 965, 970 (1999). 
 45 See Dana Brakman Reiser, Essay, For-Profit Philanthropy, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2437, 2447–49 
(2009) (describing pervasiveness of corporate charitable giving and corporate social responsibility programs). 
 46 Id. 
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of social enterprise, adopting entities must meet a baseline standard that 
demands something different. 
Governments creating specialized forms should require entities adopting 
them to prioritize social good in their affairs overall.47 Not every decision that 
adopting entities make or every penny they spend must demonstrably prioritize 
social good over profit. Unlike a purely for-profit entity, though, a social 
enterprise organized using a specialized, government-sponsored form should 
be able to show it prioritizes social good as a general matter and over time.48 
Some may argue this standard pushes the social enterprise category too 
close to the nonprofit pole, as charities are also charged with pursuing their 
missions rather than profits for owners. There is a key difference, however. For 
nonprofits, social good is not just the priority, it is the sole use to which profits 
may be put. By law, nonprofits cannot distribute profits to owners.49 The basic 
premise of specialized forms reverses this nondistribution constraint. The 
baseline standard I advocate does not disturb permission for entities adopting 
specialized forms to pursue profits or to distribute them to owners. It simply 
demands that they prioritize social good over profit-focused goals as a general 
matter. 
True, some founders who view themselves as social entrepreneurs may not 
wish to prioritize social good as much as this standard would require. Some 
investors may not want to risk their capital with an entity committed to 
prioritizing social good over profit.50 Some employees may distrust the 
longevity of a company with this commitment; some consumers may doubt the 
efficiency of its operations. For them, the universe of for-profit entities “doing 
both” remains available and sufficient. To access a specialized social enterprise 
form, governments should set prioritization of social good as the required 
baseline. 
Notice also that my standard leaves social good undefined. I understand 
that this term is vague and contested. I leave it open intentionally and 
 
 47 In his critique of the benefit corporation, Professor Murray also argued in favor of requiring 
prioritization. See Murray, supra note 38, at 27–31. His desire for clear guidance for directors, however, would 
likely not be satisfied by my admittedly still-general standard. See id. at 29–31.  
 48 Importantly, not every entity that currently claims the social enterprise mantle—including, perhaps 
some mentioned at the outset of this Article—would meet this more rigorous standard. 
 49 See supra Part I.A. 
 50 This limitation on investment could be quite serious. See Chertok et al., supra note 29, at 46 (quoting 
Heerad Sabeti, who lamented that social enterprises that are able to attract funding to grow “often do so by 
compromising their mission and values in order to satisfy investor demands”). 
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inevitably. Allowing individuals the freedom to pursue their own visions of the 
social good, rather than one prescribed by fiat, is necessary to produce a 
vibrant and pluralistic civil society. Outside minimal requirements of 
lawfulness and compliance with public policy, even legal definitions of charity 
are extremely capacious.51 Current statutory formulations for social enterprises 
follow suit. They treat social good as encompassing traditionally charitable 
activity, as well as pursuing the interests of stakeholders as proximate as 
employees and as distant as the global environment and society at large.52 
Here, early legislation reflects good choices. Founders adopting specialized 
forms should have wide discretion to choose the social good they choose to 
pursue, but then should be required to differentiate themselves by prioritizing 
that social good over profit. 
B. Imposing the Standard 
Specialized form legislation should impose a clear social-good 
prioritization standard on organizations themselves and on the actions of their 
leaders. To impose this standard on organizations, statutes should state 
unambiguously that the social purposes of adopting entities must trump their 
business purposes. To impose it on leaders and managers, legislation should 
structure fiduciaries’ duties to require prioritization of social good. 
Unfortunately, current legislative efforts rarely do either. 
1. Legislating Standards for Adopting Entities 
As noted earlier, L3C statutes require an adopting entity to “significantly 
further the accomplishment of one or more charitable or educational purposes” 
as defined under the tax code.53 This language requires an L3C to pursue social 
good, but not to prioritize it. The legislation also demands that L3Cs “would 
 
 51 See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006) (describing the category of exempt organizations as those pursuing 
“religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national 
or international amateur sports competition . . . or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals”); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 28 & cmt. f, 29 (2003) (stating that “[c]haritable trust purposes include: 
(a) the relief of poverty; (b) the advancement of knowledge or education; (c) the advancement of religion; (d) 
the promotion of health; (e) governmental or municipal purposes; and (f) other purposes that are beneficial to 
the community” and that charitable trusts are subject to the rule of section 29 that trust purposes and provisions 
must not be unlawful or contrary to public policy); MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT 
ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION 127 (2004) (describing the long lists of 
charitable purposes for which many state nonprofit corporate statutes allow formation and that many also 
repeat the provisions of I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)).  
 52 E.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27)(A) (West Supp. 2012). 
 53 E.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 1611(1) (2012). 
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not have been formed but for the company’s relationship to the 
accomplishment of charitable or educational purposes.”54 This seems to 
address the founder’s motivation for forming the entity, but again lacks a clear 
command to prioritize pursuit of social good. Finally, the statutes warn: 
No significant purpose of the entity is the production of income or the 
appreciation of property provided, however, that the fact that an 
entity produces significant income or capital appreciation shall not, in 
the absence of other factors, be conclusive evidence of a significant 
purpose involving the production of income or the appreciation of 
property.55 
A fair reading of this admittedly confusing language would prohibit an L3C 
from prioritizing profit overall. Unfortunately, the somewhat contradictory 
provisions in the language undermine even this conclusion. Further, a 
prohibition on prioritizing profit still does not affirmatively require an L3C to 
prioritize social good. 
The other forms fall even shorter, generally adopting an explicit “do both” 
approach to corporate purposes. FPCs are formed “to engage in any lawful act 
or activity . . . for the benefit of the long-term and the short-term interests of 
the flexible purpose corporation and its shareholders and in furtherance 
of . . . [one or more] enumerated [social-good] purposes.”56 The statute does 
not require prioritization of one type of purpose or the other in any way. 
Benefit corporations must be formed to pursue a general public benefit but also 
can pursue any lawful business purpose. While a benefit corporation may 
choose to set its public benefit up as a limit on its business purposes, under all 
but one statute this path is optional.57 New York’s statute, which became 
effective in 2012 and perhaps signals future legislative improvements in 
standard setting, is an important outlier. For New York benefit corporations, 
“[t]he purpose to create general public benefit shall be a limitation on the other 
purposes of the benefit corporation, and shall control over any inconsistent 
purpose of the benefit corporation.”58 This clear command for adopting entities 
 
 54 E.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27)(A)(ii). 
 55 E.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-29-102(a)(ix)(B) (West Supp. 2012).  
 56 CAL. CORP. CODE § 2602(b) (West 2013) (emphasis added). 
 57 See, e.g., id. § 14610(a); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-06(a)(2) (West Supp. 2012); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-5(a) (West Supp. 2012). 
 58 N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1706(a) (McKinney Supp. 2012). Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-5(a) 
(“This purpose is in addition to, and may be a limitation on, its purpose under its certificate of incorporation 
and any specific purpose set forth in its certificate of incorporation.” (emphasis added)), with N.Y. BUS. CORP. 
LAW § 1706(a). 
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to prioritize social good is commendable and should be emulated in future 
legislation. 
2. Legislating Standards for Fiduciaries 
Legislation creating specialized forms should also impose a patent mandate 
that their fiduciaries must prioritize social good. After all, these entities are 
legal fictions and can only act through the leaders and managers who operate 
them. John Tyler forcefully argued that L3C statutes have done so. In his view: 
[They] clearly impose an unambiguous ordering of fiduciary 
priorities:  
• the primary purpose of the L3C operations must prioritize 
pursuing charitable, exempt purposes, thereby exalting 
charitable purpose above all other purposes; and  
• realizing profit and enhancing value can be purposes of the 
enterprise as long as they are not significant purposes, 
thereby subordinating profit motive and placing it not just 
secondary on the continuum of permissible purposes, but 
near the extreme end of such continuum.59 
J. Haskell Murray and Edward Hwang similarly concluded that the L3C’s 
purpose language “convey[s] a mandate for an L3C manager to prioritize the 
organization’s charitable purpose above all other things and to consider such 
priority as a framework for fiduciary duties of loyalty and care.”60 This careful 
parsing of the statutory language is surely a reasonable purposive interpretation 
by sophisticated experts. But, a standard that social enterprises, their 
fiduciaries, and counsel might find in reading between statutory lines is 
insufficient. For limitations on fiduciary conduct to differentiate a new 
category of specialized forms, they must clearly and explicitly instruct these 
leaders to prioritize social good. The brief and muddled mandate L3C statutes 
contain does not go nearly this far.61 
 
 59 Tyler, supra note 24, at 141 (footnotes omitted). 
 60 Murray & Hwang, supra note 35, at 27–28. 
 61 Callison and Vestal likewise challenged Tyler’s view of the LC3’s requirements for fiduciaries. See 
Callison & Vestal, supra note 27, at 286–88. The strange statutory formulation is actually borrowed from 
federal tax legislation describing a program-related investment (PRI). A PRI is an investment made by a 
private foundation to further its exempt purpose. See I.R.C. § 4944(c) (2006); see also Examples of Program-
Related Investments by Private Foundations—Proposed Regulations, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-
Non-Profits/Examples-of-Program-Related-Investments-by-Private-Foundations-%E2%80%93-Proposed-
Regulations (last updated Nov. 19, 2012). If such an investment meets the tax law requirements now 
incorporated into L3C statutes, it will qualify as a PRI, will count toward the foundation’s required annual 
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Although benefit corporation and FPC statutes discuss the role of directors 
in great detail, they do not impose a clear standard requiring fiduciaries to 
prioritize social good.62 Benefit corporation language typically includes a 
specialized standard for directors’ conduct. In it, directors are instructed to 
consider a laundry list of constituencies. For example, under Vermont law: 
[Directors] shall, in determining what the director reasonably 
believes to be in the best interests of the benefit corporation, consider 
the effects of any action or inaction upon: 
(A) the shareholders of the benefit corporation; 
(B) the employees and workforce of the benefit corporation and its 
subsidiaries and suppliers;  
(C) the interests of customers to the extent they are beneficiaries of 
the general or specific public benefit purposes of the benefit 
corporation;  
(D) community and societal considerations, including those of any 
community in which offices or facilities of the benefit corporation or 
its subsidiaries or suppliers are located; 
(E) the local and global environment; and 
(F) the long-term and short-term interests of the benefit corporation, 
including the possibility that those interests may be best served by 
the continued independence of the benefit corporation.63 
This language clearly neutralizes any real or perceived shareholder wealth 
maximization norm, drawing heavily on constituency statutes. Unlike most 
constituency statutes, which only free directors to consider the interests of 
various stakeholders, benefit corporation statutes mandate their consideration. 
The language does not, however, require directors to prioritize social good. In 
fact, benefit corporation statutes frequently reject the idea of prioritization 
expressly.64 
 
distributions, and will not trigger penalties as a jeopardizing investment. See id. The L3C was initially 
formulated as a vehicle to receive PRIs. See Cassady V. (“Cass”) Brewer, A Novel Approach to Using LLCs 
for Quasi-Charitable Endeavors (A/K/A “Social Enterprise”), 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 678, 680 n.4, 682 
(2012); Elizabeth Schmidt, Vermont’s Social Hybrid Pioneers: Early Observations and Questions to Ponder, 
35 VT. L. REV. 163, 165 (2010). Nothing in the statute, however, limits it to this use and an early study 
suggests it is not the major reason for most L3C adoptions. See id. at 177–78. 
 62 See Brakman Reiser, supra note 25, at 598–600; Callison, supra note 38, at 24–25; Murray, supra note 
38, at 27–31. 
 63 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.09(a)(1) (West Supp. 2012) (emphasis added). Many benefit 
corporations bestow even greater discretion on benefit corporation directors, who may also consider “any other 
pertinent factors or the interests of any other group that the director determines are appropriate to consider.” Id. 
§ 21.09(a)(2); see also HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D-6(a)(2)(H) (2012) (using essentially identical language). 
 64 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1821(A)(3) (2013) (stating that directors “[s]hall not be required 
to give priority to the interests of a particular person or group . . . over the interests of any other person or 
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Perversely, while this standard seeks to make stakeholder interests more 
potent in the boardroom, it may simply give fiduciaries license to do whatever 
they want. The familiar concern that constituency statutes in fact act as director 
protection is well taken here.65 With such a lengthy list of permissible 
considerations and no instruction on prioritization, one can question whether 
any standard of conduct for benefit corporation directors evaporates.66 
The standard of conduct imposed on FPC directors is quite different, but 
still does not require them to treat social good as their priority. The California 
legislation expands directors’ discretion to: 
consider those factors, and give weight to those factors, as the 
director deems relevant, including the short-term and long-term 
prospects of the flexible purpose corporation, the best interests of the 
flexible purpose corporation and its shareholders, and the purposes of 
the flexible purpose corporation as set forth in its articles.67 
Thus, directors may consider only the particular special purpose or purposes 
identified for their FPC and expressed in its articles of incorporation.68 
Notably, consideration of these purposes is permissive, not mandatory.69 While 
this FPC language might be characterized as “do both” and compared 
favorably to benefit corporation statutes’ instruction to “do everything,” it does 
not demand that FPC leaders prioritize social good. 
In future iterations, specialized form legislation should provide fiduciaries 
with not only discretion, but real guidance. It should state plainly that 
fiduciaries of adopting entities are duty-bound to prioritize social good. 
 
group unless” the organization’s articles express a contrary intention); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.09(a)(3) 
(rejecting a similar prioritization requirement). 
 65 See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE 
LAW 38 (1991) (“[A] manager told to serve two masters (a little for the equity holders, a little for the 
community) has been freed of both and is answerable to neither.”); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the 
Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1493 
(1992) (“[T]he primary effect of these constituency statutes is simply to enhance managers’ discretion in 
responding to hostile takeover bids.”). 
 66 Brakman Reiser, supra note 25, at 599–600. 
 67 CAL. CORP. CODE § 2700(c) (West 2013). 
 68 See id. 
 69 See id. 
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3. Imposing Standards by Judicial Interpretation 
To date, specialized form legislation has seldom included clear mandates 
and future legislative efforts may fail to incorporate them.70 Thus, it is 
important to consider whether courts will interpret existing concepts of 
fiduciary obligation to require social-good prioritization. After all, the 
fiduciary duty idea is known and vaunted for its malleability; its meaning and 
requirements change with the context in which it is applied.71 If judicial 
interpretation can effectively embed social-good prioritization within fiduciary 
duty concepts, legislative clarity may not be indispensable. 
For-profit organizational forms all impose fiduciary duties of loyalty on 
their leaders and vest investors with authority to enforce them.72 For corporate 
directors, this duty demands that fiduciaries act with good faith and loyalty, not 
putting their personal interests before those of the enterprises they serve.73 Of 
course, avoiding self-dealing or unfair competition is likewise necessary for 
dutiful service to a social enterprise. But it is not sufficient to train fiduciaries’ 
attention on prioritizing social good. 
Imagine a social enterprise founded to pursue “a cooler, greener planet and 
profits for owners by producing clean energy technology.” It needs to choose a 
new supplier for the primary input in its sole product. The decision is one of 
great magnitude, since the cost of procuring this input represents 75% of the 
company’s production expenses. One potential supplier offers the input for a 
very low price; the other supplier prices the input considerably higher but 
produces it with a smaller carbon footprint. A narrow reading of loyalty 
prohibits a fiduciary from sourcing the input from a supplier she controls, at 
least if the price agreed upon is above market. Yet it gives her no guidance on 
how to balance the competing aims of profit and social good. Traditional 
 
 70 See supra Part II.2. 
 71 See TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW 1–6 (2011) (noting fiduciary duty’s application and differing 
elements in varying contexts, in a work attempting to define a common core of fiduciary concept); Deborah A. 
DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 879 (“Although one 
can identify common core principles of fiduciary obligation, these principles apply with greater or lesser force 
in different contexts involving different types of parties and relationships.”).  
 72 In this Part, I draw on for-profit and nonprofit corporate fiduciary law to anticipate how courts might 
delineate the duties of fiduciaries of social enterprises taking specialized forms. Still further instruction might 
be drawn from LLC law’s concept of good faith and fair dealing or fiduciary concepts applicable in other 
forms of organization. I decline to consider additional alternatives here out of concern doing so would make an 
already lengthy discussion unwieldy. 
 73 See JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS LAW § 10.9, at 221 (3d ed. 
2011). 
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loyalty concepts will also provide plaintiffs and courts no signposts for 
determining when fiduciaries have struck an inappropriate balance. In the 
absence of clear legislative mandates, judges will need to expand the idea of 
the duty of loyalty beyond these typically narrow quarters for it to spur our 
fiduciary to prioritize social good. 
Perhaps instead, the duty of care would provide the necessary direction. It 
requires fiduciaries to act prudently.74 As they make decisions they must 
inform themselves suitably, may rely upon experts as needed, and can delegate 
to committees when appropriate.75 Yet these process-oriented indicia of care 
will not require fiduciaries to prioritize social good. To do so, the duty of care 
would need to include a substantive component beyond mere rationality.76 
Judges would need to opine that careful action equates with erring on the side 
of social good. 
The process-heavy nature of typical care obligations is exacerbated by 
application of the business judgment rule. Under this rule, courts defer to 
corporate fiduciaries’ nonconflicted, good faith decisions taken with adequate 
information. It is drawn from for-profit corporate law, but has been applied to 
nonprofit fiduciaries as well.77 Like in the for-profit realm, application of this 
rule to nonprofits is based on courts’ professed nonexpertise in their affairs78 
and a desire not to discourage fiduciaries from responsible risk taking.79 Unless 
legislatively overridden, the business judgment rule will likely be applied to 
social enterprises adopting specialized forms for these same reasons.80 Courts 
 
 74 See id. § 10.2, at 201. 
 75 See id. § 10.4, at 208–12. 
 76 See id. § 10.5, at 212. 
 77 See REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.30 cmt. 3 (1987) (“While the application of the 
business judgment rule to directors of nonprofit corporations is not firmly established by the case law, its use is 
consistent with [the statute].”); FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 51, at 209–11, 226–27 (noting codifications and 
judicial support for applying the business judgment rule in the nonprofit context); see also 1 LARRY E. 
RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE ON LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES § 9:2 (2008) 
(addressing the role of the business judgment rule in LLC managers’ duties of care); Larry E. Ribstein, An 
Analysis of the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 35, 65 (2008) 
(criticizing application of the rule to LLCs in part because it “introduces a corporate concept that is an 
inappropriate default rule for partnership-type and closely held firms”). 
 78 Cf. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 
83, 119 (2004) (“Judges likely have less general business expertise than [for-profit] directors.”). 
 79 See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 51, at 210; Harvey J. Goldschmid, The Fiduciary Duties of Nonprofit 
Directors and Officers: Paradoxes, Problems, and Proposed Reforms, 23 J. CORP. L. 631, 644 (1998). 
 80 Murray advocated the application of such a rule, the “purpose judgment rule,” to benefit corporations. 
See Murray, supra note 38, at 41. Under it, “only if a director of a benefit corporation consciously failed to 
carry out her duties in good faith, knowingly violated the law or prioritized her own self-interest, would the 
real possibility of liability exist.” Id.  
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will have no desire to shackle fiduciaries to crabbed and conservative strategies 
alone—the whole idea of specialized forms is to encourage a new and bold 
way of thinking about doing business and creating social good. 
Recall our fiduciary’s decision whether to source her company’s major 
input from the cheaper or greener supplier. She would seem to comply with her 
duty of care obligations to inform herself and attend to her duties with 
prudence by putting the contract out for bid and selecting the lowest priced bid 
from among those the company received. The business judgment rule would 
shield her from liability with even less effort. It would defer to the fiduciary’s 
choice unless it represented a conflict of interest, lacked good faith, or was 
badly uninformed. The traditional duty of care will encourage directors to use 
deliberate and conscientious methods when making decisions that pit social 
good and profit against each other, which they absolutely should. It will not, 
however, tell them to prioritize social good. 
Courts might reach beyond narrow understandings of loyalty or care to 
impose a social-good prioritization standard. For example, courts could 
interpret good faith differently for specialized form fiduciaries. The meaning of 
good faith has been much discussed in recent commentary on Delaware 
corporate caselaw.81 Until Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 
some commentators even argued it constituted an independent, third category 
of directors’ fiduciary obligation.82 Stone rejected that position and sited good 
faith firmly within the ambit of the duty of loyalty.83 Directors must act in 
good faith to meet their loyalty obligations, but a showing of lack of good faith 
alone will not ground liability.84 Given the flexibility of fiduciary duty law 
generally, and the lack of Delaware dominance in social enterprise law, there is 
 
 81 See, e.g., Tara L. Dunn, The Developing Theory of Good Faith in Director Conduct: Are Delaware 
Courts Ready to Force Corporate Directors to Go Out-of-Pocket After Disney IV?, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 531 
(2005); Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate Law 
Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L.J. 1 (2005); Charles W. Murdock, Fairness and Good Faith as a Precept in the Law 
of Corporations and Other Business Organizations, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 551 (2005); John L. Reed & Matt 
Neiderman, “Good Faith” and the Ability of Directors to Assert Section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General 
Corporation Law as a Defense to Claims Alleging Abdication, Lack of Oversight, and Similar Breaches of 
Fiduciary Duty, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 111 (2004); David Rosenberg, Making Sense of Good Faith in Delaware 
Corporate Fiduciary Law: A Contractarian Approach, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 491 (2004). 
 82 See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Good Faith in Corporate Law, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 3 
(2006); Hillary A. Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456, 494 (2004); see also Leo E. Strine, 
Jr. et al., Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role of Good Faith in Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629 
(2010) (detailing, and critiquing, this debate). 
 83 See 911 A.2d 362, 369–70 (Del. 2006) (en banc). 
 84 See id. 
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no need for courts addressing specialized forms to follow this narrow path. If 
legislation does not impose a fiduciary duty to prioritize social good explicitly, 
courts can interpret good faith in this context to require it. 
The duty of obedience offers courts another pathway by which they can 
impose a mandate to prioritize social good. Although the duty of obedience in 
modern for-profit corporate law is typically understood primarily to require 
regulatory compliance,85 many commentators argue a more expansive duty of 
obedience constrains the work of nonprofit fiduciaries.86 In their view, “the 
duty of obedience requires that a director act with fidelity, within the bounds of 
the law generally, to the organization’s ‘mission,’ as expressed in its charter 
and by-laws.”87 Commentators debate whether obedience is a separate and 
independent duty of nonprofit directors, but even those who dispute its 
existence as a separate duty agree nonprofit fiduciaries must adhere to 
purposes of the entities they serve.88 If legislatures fail to directly impose a 
 
 85 See Alan R. Palmiter, Duty of Obedience: The Forgotten Duty, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 457, 460–61 
(2010–2011). Fiduciary duties requiring obedience can also be found in agency law and trust law. See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 76(1) (2007) (recognizing a trustee’s “duty to administer the trust . . . in 
accordance with [its terms] and applicable law”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.09 (2006) (noting 
agent’s “duty to take action only within the scope of the agent’s actual authority” and to “comply with all 
lawful instructions received from the principal”); id. § 1.01 & cmt. f; see also FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 51, 
at 225–26 (discussing obedience in the context of private and charitable trusts); Megan Wischmeier Shaner, 
Restoring the Balance of Power in Corporate Management: Enforcing an Officer’s Duty of Obedience, 66 
BUS. LAW. 27, 44–46 (2010) (discussing the duty of obedience in agency law in an article arguing for its 
application to corporate officers). 
 86 See DANIEL L. KURTZ, BOARD LIABILITY: GUIDE FOR NONPROFIT DIRECTORS 84–86 (1988) 
(articulating the duty of obedience as such and explaining its demands on nonprofit fiduciaries); Rob Atkinson, 
Obedience as the Foundation of Fiduciary Duty, 34 J. CORP. L. 43 (2008) (offering an expansive review of the 
duty of obedience across corporate and trust contexts); Palmiter, supra note 85, at 466–69 (summarizing the 
duty’s requirements); see also Melanie DiPietro, Duty of Obedience: A Medieval Explanation for Modern 
Nonprofit Governance Accountability, 46 DUQ. L. REV. 99, 102 (2007) (arguing that a separate duty of 
obedience for nonprofit fiduciaries is needed); Linda Sugin, Resisting the Corporatization of Nonprofit 
Governance: Transforming Obedience into Fidelity, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 893, 904–05, 919–27 (2007) 
(advocating reinvigoration of a requirement of nonprofit fiduciaries’ obedience to mission as a duty of 
fidelity).  
 87 KURTZ, supra note 86, at 21; see also Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp. v. Spitzer, 715 N.Y.S.2d 
575, 593 (Sup. Ct. 1999) (“It is axiomatic that the Board of Directors is charged with the duty to ensure that 
the mission of the charitable corporation is carried out. This duty has been referred to as the ‘duty of 
obedience.’”). 
 88 See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS §§ 300 cmt. g, 320 cmt. e (Tentative 
Draft No. 1, 2007) (articulating such an obligation without approving a separate duty of obedience); FREMONT-
SMITH, supra note 51, at 225–26 (arguing obedience to mission is appropriately seen as a component of the 
duty of loyalty); Goldschmid, supra note 79, at 641 (arguing obedience to mission is appropriately seen as a 
component of the duty of care). 
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duty to prioritize social good on specialized form fiduciaries, courts can hold 
such prioritization is an inherent requirement of their duty of obedience. 
This might be easiest in an FPC, whose articles will dedicate the entity to at 
least one special purpose. For other types of entities, formative documents may 
speak in very general terms, offering little guidance to fiduciaries, litigants, 
and courts. Analogous obstacles arise and have been overcome, however, in 
charitable entities; organizational documents can say little about mission and 
modern charters often permit the organization to pursue “any lawful 
purpose.”89 Of course, even if purpose language is very specific, obedience to 
it should not be slavish. Like charities, to be effective, social enterprises often 
will need to evolve over time to meet society’s changing needs.90 
Consider again our supply-chain decision. Our fiduciary will have an easier 
time choosing a supplier if specialized forms contain a social-good 
prioritization mandate—a sort of tiebreaker for close cases. She can safely 
select the greener supplier, erring on the side of furthering the entity’s 
environmental mission. Of course, this does not mean these fiduciaries will 
face no hard choices. Real decisions may not be this stark, such as if the entity 
was also founded to serve the local community and the greener vendor 
operated out of state. 
Nor does a mandate to prioritize social good rob fiduciaries of all their 
discretion. It bears repeating that not every decision fiduciaries make must 
demonstrably further social good. The requirement is to make social good the 
organization’s priority as a general matter. In decisions of smaller impact for 
the entity, profit-seeking outcomes can be favored. Furthermore, fiduciaries 
can pursue subtler solutions as long as they fit within an overall prioritization 
of social good. Even on this major vendor decision, fiduciaries might 
appropriately decide to source some of their supply from the cheaper vendor. 
Or, perhaps, awarding the contract to the cheaper, emitting vendor is justified 
here because of recent major decisions pursuing environmental gains. A 
command to prioritize social good hardly turns fiduciaries into do-gooding 
robots, reflexively taking every decision in furtherance of social mission, 
 
 89 See Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 497, 510 (1981). 
 90 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS §§ 300 cmt. g, 320 cmt. e (Tentative Draft 
No. 1, 2007); FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 51, at 225–26; Dana Brakman Reiser, Charity Law’s Essentials, 86 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 12–13 (2011); Dana Brakman Reiser, Filling the Gaps in Nonprofit Accountability: 
Applying the Club Perspective in the U.S. Legal System, in VOLUNTARY REGULATION OF NGOS AND 
NONPROFITS: AN ACCOUNTABILITY CLUB FRAMEWORK 41, 48–49 (Mary Kay Gugerty & Aseem Prakash eds., 
2010).  
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damning the consequences for investors. It does, however, provide a baseline 
of content to help fiduciaries resolve otherwise paralyzing dilemmas. 
There is no caselaw on these questions to date, but when cases arise courts 
should use these or other interpretive vehicles to impose a clear social-good 
prioritization standard. As discussed above,91 I disagree with Tyler’s view that 
“the L3C statutes clearly impose an unambiguous ordering of fiduciary 
priorities.”92 I agree, however, that social-good prioritization would be a fair 
gloss for courts to apply to L3C statutes. It could also be easily read into the 
fiduciary duties of New York benefit corporations, whose social-good 
purposes control over any other inconsistent objectives. For other explicitly 
“do both” statutes, courts would need to be somewhat more aggressive, but 
would be acting within a long tradition of common law fiduciary duty 
interpretation. 
C. Conclusion 
Taking New York’s lead, specialized form legislation should clearly state 
that only social enterprises that prioritize social good may adopt the specialized 
forms they enable. It should also definitively bind their fiduciaries to prioritize 
social good. If legislation fails to do so, courts should take up the cause as they 
interpret the fiduciary obligations of social enterprise leaders over time. 
This social-good prioritization standard will not ensure that every adopting 
entity will meet everyone’s standards for a good, socially conscious, 
responsible, or green company. Individual entities are free to promise they will 
do more.93 And, investors, employees, and customers are free to demand more 
from those companies with whom they associate. But, requiring adopting 
entities to prioritize social good will identify them as meaningfully distinct 
from ordinary for-profits. Their ability to distribute profits to owners will mark 
them as importantly different from nonprofits.94 Imposing this standard will 
 
 91 Supra Part II.B.2. 
 92 Tyler, supra note 24, at 141. 
 93 Ordinary antifraud provisions may be used to police these claims. Cf. Tyler, supra note 24, at 156 
(describing the potential use of fraud claims to police failures by L3C fiduciaries to prioritize charitable goals). 
 94 Note this definition is widely found in the business literature on social enterprise. See, e.g., FRANK 
MARTIN & MARCUS THOMPSON, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE: DEVELOPING SUSTAINABLE BUSINESSES 5–6 (2010) 
(noting “[t]he most common definition that appears in texts written about social enterprise” in the United 
Kingdom is “a business with primarily social objectives whose surpluses are reinvested for that purpose in the 
business or in the community, rather than being driven by the need to maximise profit for shareholders and 
owners”); JANE WEI-SKILLERN ET AL., ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN THE SOCIAL SECTOR 4 (2007) (stating in a 
business school text that for social enterprises “[t]he creation of social value takes precedence over the creation 
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differentiate those entities adopting specialized forms as part of a new and 
significant category, assuming it can be enforced. The next Part examines this 
pivotal assumption. 
III.  ENFORCING THE STANDARD 
A social-good prioritization standard will have only expressive value unless 
specialized form legislation also establishes mechanisms for enforcing it. 
Recent enactments offer many insights on how to shape enforcement. This Part 
goes beyond those extant examples, however, to develop a typology of 
enforcement mechanisms upon which specialized forms might rely. These 
include mechanisms that look within adopting entities for enforcement 
resources, as well as mechanisms that pursue enforcement externally, through 
public or even private regulators. 
In situations where enforcement is suboptimal, self-regulation regimes 
often develop if enforcement is of value to the relevant industry. Social 
entrepreneurs’ own interest in achieving their social missions and branding 
their entities as truly different may motivate them to find their own methods of 
enforcement. They could define goals and limitations on their enterprises’ 
activities in partnership, operating, or shareholder agreements.95 They could 
maintain a controlling ownership position for themselves or a trusted few.96 
They could adopt a financing structure that locks themselves and investors into 
a pact to prioritize social good.97 These options may eventually create 
limitations on scale, but can be effective for many if not most social enterprises 
even for the long term. Still, they are individual responses, not ones compelled 
or even driven by organizational form. 
 
of personal shareholder or stakeholder wealth”); Sabeti, supra note 9, at 99 (explaining in the Harvard 
Business Review that social enterprises “generate earned income but give top priority to an explicit social 
mission”). For a more detailed discussion of the business literature’s use of the terms social enterprise and 
social entrepreneurship, see J. GREGORY DEES, THE MEANING OF “SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP” (2001), 
available at http://www.caseatduke.org/documents/dees_sedef.pdf. In this influential white paper, Dees noted 
that for social entrepreneurs, “[m]ission-related impact becomes the central criterion, not wealth creation.” Id. 
at 2.  
 95 See Callison & Vestal, supra note 27, at 286–88 (describing this strategy in the LLC context); see also, 
e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.32 (2010) (granting shareholders broad discretion in crafting shareholder 
agreements to fit their needs, even in many situations otherwise “inconsistent” with the Act’s provisions). 
 96 See Dees & Anderson, supra note 7, at 17–19 (describing retaining control with owners sympathetic to 
a social enterprise’s social missions as a strategy for maintaining it). 
 97 See Dana Brakman Reiser & Steven A. Dean, Hunting Stag with FLY Paper: A Hybrid Financial 
Instrument for Social Enterprise, 54 B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013). 
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For a specialized form for social enterprise to lead social entrepreneurs to 
achieve social mission, the form itself must provide a ready answer to the 
enforcement question. None of the current forms have yet accomplished this. 
There are clear legislative or judicial paths for establishing a social-good 
prioritization standard. Establishing effective enforcement mechanisms is more 
difficult, yet legislators and social entrepreneurs must meet this challenge for 
specialized forms to succeed. 
A. Enforcement from Within 
Legislation creating specialized forms could empower one or more groups 
within adopting entities to engage in enforcement activity. The first line of 
defense is self-discipline by organizational leaders. Many fiduciaries will strive 
to meet the obligations the law imposes, even without a serious threat of 
enforcement, provided they understand the law’s limits.98 The concern about 
understanding what the law requires is especially serious in the benefit 
corporation, where the sheer number of mandatory considerations for 
fiduciaries may be overwhelming. But L3C and FPC directors also lack 
guidelines on how to handle the inevitable moments when profit and social 
good conflict. The structure of L3C legislation might provide attentive 
fiduciaries some clues. The FPC statute’s limitation on the universe of 
potential social goods FPC directors can consider also offers directors some 
moorings.99 Still, the essential “do both” approach adopted by all of these 
forms offers fiduciaries little guidance. A clear standard prioritizing social 
good would improve fiduciaries’ ability to self-police. 
1. Investor Enforcement 
Specialized forms need not rely, however, solely on fiduciaries’ good 
intentions. They may also inform, empower, and incentivize investors and 
other stakeholders to enforce social-good prioritization. Current forms 
prominently feature private enforcement by investors, arming them with an 
array of informational, voting, and litigation rights. This subsection canvasses 
 
 98 See Julian Velasco, The Role of Aspiration in Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
519, 524 (2012) (arguing that the unenforced duty “is a meaningful concept because people obey the law for 
many different reasons, and not simply out of fear of punishment”). 
 99 See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2700(c) (West 2013) (permitting directors to look to “those factors, and give 
weight to those factors, as the director deems relevant, including the short-term and long-term prospects of the 
flexible purpose corporation, the best interests of the flexible purpose corporation and its shareholders, and the 
purposes of the flexible purpose corporation as set forth in its articles”). 
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these investor rights—and other rights future legislation might consider—and 
evaluates their potential to enforce a standard of social-good prioritization. 
a. Informational Rights 
Information is a precondition for effective investor enforcement. Without 
knowledge of how fiduciaries are undertaking their roles, and in particular how 
they are handling the inevitable conflicts between profit and social good, even 
empowered and motivated investors will have little enforcement impact. 
Traditional for-profit forms recognize investors’ need for information and 
entitle them to information about the conduct of a business.100 These basic 
informational rights can, and frequently have, been carried over to specialized 
forms. 
In profit-focused entities, the information investors receive naturally 
emphasizes business outcomes and profit forecasts, explaining their expected 
impact on investor earnings. This content must be adjusted to empower 
investors in social enterprises. These investors still need information about 
profit, but they also need information about how an enterprise is pursuing 
social good and balancing these goals. Moreover, they need not only 
information on outcomes, but also some visibility into entities’ decision-
making processes, especially when profit and social good come into conflict. 
The benefit corporation and FPC statutorily expand disclosure to investors in 
this fashion. 
All benefit corporation statutes require adopting entities to distribute to 
their shareholders an annual “benefit report” and post it on their public 
website, if one exists.101 This report must describe “[t]he ways in which the 
 
 100 Basic financial reports must be disclosed upon investor request and, for a proper purpose, investors 
must be given access to the company’s books and records. Information will also be provided at shareholder, 
member, or partnership meetings in preparation for director elections or other shareholder votes. See, e.g., 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (West Supp. 2012). The Model Business Corporation Act also requires those 
regulated by it to distribute annual financial statements to shareholders. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 16.20 
(2010). But see COX & HAZEN, supra note 73, § 13.6, at 354 (explaining that “the response of state legislatures 
was not favorable” to this Model Act feature but that the federal securities laws served the same purpose for 
public companies). For disclosure duties in LLCs, see generally 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 77, § 9:5, 
which notes that “[a]n LLC manager probably has no ongoing affirmative duty to disclose developments 
concerning the LLC to the members in the absence of some transaction or event, including a demand for 
information, which would lead the member to expect disclosure.” Where they apply, investors may also obtain 
information about the companies in which they invest from disclosures mandated by federal and state 
securities laws. COX & HAZEN, supra note 73, § 13.6, at 354. 
 101 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 14630(a)–(c); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1708(a)–(c) (McKinney Supp. 
2012). 
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benefit corporation pursued a general public benefit during the year and the 
extent to which the general public benefit was created,” along with “[a]ny 
circumstances that have hindered the creation by the benefit corporation of the 
public benefit.”102 In addition, the report must assess the entity’s performance 
with respect to its chosen third-party standard.103 Some benefit corporation 
enabling acts also mandate that adopting entities seat a “benefit director” to 
“prepare . . . a statement whether, in the opinion of the benefit director, the 
benefit corporation acted in accordance with its general, and any specific, 
public benefit purpose in all material respects during the period covered by the 
report” for inclusion in the annual report.104 Also, “[i]f in the opinion of the 
benefit director the benefit corporation . . . failed to act in accordance with its 
public benefit purpose, then the statement of the benefit director shall include a 
description of the ways in which the benefit corporation or its directors or 
officers failed to act.”105 The basic benefit report disclosures are primarily 
outcome based. Required reporting on obstacles to achieving social good and 
the opinion of benefit directors, though, can give investors insight on the 
profit–social-good tradeoffs their benefit corporations have made in a given 
year and over time. 
California’s FPC statute goes even further, requiring boards to send 
shareholders two-part annual disclosures and post them publicly when 
confidentiality is not a barrier.106 The two parts track the dual mission of an 
FPC. The first part addresses financial performance, including a current 
balance sheet, income statement, and statement of cashflows, along with an 
independent accountant’s report or officer’s validating certificate.107 The 
contents of the second part are highly scripted and require comprehensive 
reporting on an FPC’s achievement of its chosen special purpose or purposes. 
This part of the annual report must include: 
 
 102 MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-08(a)(1)(i), (iii) (West Supp. 2012); see, e.g., N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 14A:18-11(a)(1)(a), (c) (West Supp. 2012) (similar); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-38-500 (Supp. 2012) 
(similar). 
 103 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D-11(a)(2) (2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-791(A)(2)(a) (West Supp. 
2012). 
 104 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-7(c); see, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D-7(c); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-38-
410(c)(1). 
 105 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-7(c); see, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156E, § 11(c)(3) (West Supp. 
2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.10 (West Supp. 2012). These same enactments permit the benefit 
corporation to appoint a “benefit officer” to prepare the annual benefit report. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
40/4.15(b)(2) (West Supp. 2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1824(B)(2) (2013); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-9. 
 106 See CAL. CORP. CODE § 3500(b).  
 107 Id. § 3500(a). Benefit corporations with fewer than 100 shareholders need not comply with generally 
accepted accounting principles in their financial statements. Id. § 3502(g). 
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(1) Identification and discussion of the short-term and long-term 
objectives of the flexible purpose corporation relating to its 
special purpose or purposes, and an identification and 
explanation of any changes made in those special purpose 
objectives during the fiscal year. 
(2) Identification and discussion of the material actions taken by 
the flexible purpose corporation during the fiscal year to 
achieve its special purpose objectives, the impact of those 
actions, including the causal relationships between the actions 
and the reported outcomes, and the extent to which those 
actions achieved the special purpose objectives for the fiscal 
year. 
(3) Identification and discussion of material actions, including the 
intended impact of those actions, that the flexible purpose 
corporation expects to take in the short term and long term 
with respect to achievement of its special purpose objectives. 
(4) A description of the process for selecting, and an identification 
and description of, the financial, operating, and other measures 
used by the flexible purpose corporation during the fiscal year 
for evaluating its performance in achieving its special purpose 
objectives, including an explanation of why the flexible 
purpose corporation selected those measures and identification 
and discussion of the nature and rationale for any material 
changes in those measures made during the fiscal year. 
(5) Identification and discussion of any material operating and 
capital expenditures incurred by the flexible purpose 
corporation during the fiscal year in furtherance of achieving 
the special purpose objectives, a good faith estimate of any 
additional material operating or capital expenditures the 
flexible purpose corporation expects to incur over the next 
three fiscal years in order to achieve its special purpose 
objectives, and other material expenditures of resources 
incurred by the flexible purpose corporation during the fiscal 
year, including employee time, in furtherance of achieving the 
special purpose objectives, including a discussion of the extent 
to which that capital or use of other resources serves purposes 
other than and in addition to furthering the achievement of the 
special purpose objectives.108 
 
 108 Id. § 3500(b). In addition to these wide-ranging required annual reports, an FPC’s board must make an 
interim report to shareholders if it decides to change or abandon one of its special purposes or if it changes its 
planned expenditures toward its special purposes from those stated in the most recent annual report. Id. § 3501. 
This obligation applies whether the change is to make a new expenditure or decline to make one previously 
planned, though it does not include changes in director or officer compensation alone. Id. 
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FPC disclosures will thus provide investors information not only on profit and 
social-good outcomes, but also significant information on the process of 
reaching them. This window into decision making can arm investors with 
important data to use in enforcing social-good prioritization. 
Compliance with these disclosure requirements may also be prohibitively 
expensive. The statute’s drafters anticipated this concern, and included a 
statutory explanation that directors need not provide every detail of their 
actions and decisions, but only “use their discretion” and “provid[e] . . . the 
reasonable detail that a reasonable investor would consider important in 
understanding the corporation’s objectives, actions, impacts, measures, 
rationale, and results of operations as they relate to the nature and achievement 
of the special purpose objectives.”109 Further, when and if best practices 
emerge for such reports, compliance with them will raise a rebuttable 
presumption that all required information was provided.110 If this leeway is 
insufficient, the legislation gives many FPCs an easy way out of the special-
purpose reporting obligation altogether. All required reports on special purpose 
can be waived by a two-thirds vote of the FPC’s shareholders if an FPC has 
fewer than 100 of them.111 Although the FPC statute’s disclosure requirements 
are quite comprehensive, it remains to be seen how widely used they will be. 
Finally, informational rights and any additional enforcement mechanisms 
predicated on the disclosures they provide raise concerns about the utility of 
the performance measures they utilize. When success cannot be measured by a 
pure financial bottom line, assessing and reporting performance will be 
difficult and contested.112 In an organization with dual purposes to pursue 
profit and social good, it will be easier to focus on and report financial 
 
 109 Id. § 3502(a). 
 110 Id. § 3502(b). 
 111 Id. § 3502(h). 
 112 See Evelyn Brody, Sunshine and Shadows on Charity Governance: Public Disclosure as a Regulatory 
Tool, 12 FLA. TAX REV. 183, 191 (2012) (lamenting that for nonprofits “performance measurement is an 
unsolved metric”); Garry W. Jenkins, Who’s Afraid of Philanthrocapitalism?, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 753, 
787–92 (2011) (elaborating on the many reasons why “measurement in the social sector is immensely 
complicated”). These problems have long been understood as a challenge for the nonprofit sector. See, e.g., 
Patrice Flynn & Virginia A. Hodgkinson, Measuring the Contributions of the Nonprofit Sector, in MEASURING 
THE IMPACT OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 3, 15 (Patrice Flynn & Virginia A. Hodgkinson eds., 2001); Rosabeth 
Moss Kanter & David V. Summers, Doing Well While Doing Good: Dilemmas of Performance Measurement 
in Nonprofit Organizations and the Need for a Multiple-Constituency Approach, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: 
A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 154, 154–59 (Walter W. Powell ed., 1987). 
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outcomes.113 Many organizations are currently working to develop better social 
performance measures for use by nonprofits as well as social enterprises, but 
these are far from perfect.114 The problems of creating and using these metrics 
will complicate any enforcement mechanism for social enterprise, and in large 
part this complication cannot be avoided. 
b. Management Rights 
Assuming investors obtain information that alerts them to failures to 
prioritize social good, the next important question in evaluating their 
enforcement capacity is: what actions can they take? Investors might engage 
directly in management and decision making, participate through voting for 
representatives or on business decisions, or be given standing to sue managers 
for failures to appropriately prioritize social good. The extent to which each of 
these paths is open to investors under current social enterprise forms depends 
on the incorporated or unincorporated nature of the entity and, in 
unincorporated entities, on the governance arrangement adopted by the parties. 
The benefit corporation and FPC forms adopt the fundamental precept of 
for-profit corporation law that management is centralized and separated from 
investors.115 Together with officers and employees, benefit corporation and 
FPC directors make everyday decisions and initiate extraordinary transactions. 
Shareholders’ participation is limited to electing directors and approving major 
organic changes like mergers, sales of all or substantially all assets, or 
dissolutions. Centralized management can have great advantages. Specialist 
managers offer expertise and efficiency and free investors from the demands 
full participation would make on their time and energy.116 Yet, unless 
 
 113 See Brakman Reiser, supra note 45, at 2464–65 (discussing the special challenges of applying social 
performance measures in a blended-mission environment). 
 114 See Murray, supra note 38, at 31–32 (discussing these efforts); see also Esposito, supra note 43, at 69–
70 (describing metrics available to assess social and environmental impact).  
 115 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (West 2006) (“The business and affairs of every 
corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors . . . .”). Scholars across the 
ideological spectrum accept the point that directions like this place everyday management of corporate affairs 
outside the hands of shareholders. See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 65 (recognizing this facet of current law in 
the context of a reform proposal to permit shareholders to initiate at least some corporate actions); Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance (Univ. of Cal., L.A. Sch. of 
Law Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 02-06, 2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=299743 (arguing for the value of this and even broader director autonomy). 
 116 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Response, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1744–46 (2006); Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: 
Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1656 (2001). 
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specialized corporate forms expand shareholders’ role, investors will lack 
statutory authority to weigh in on the everyday tradeoffs between profit and 
social good at the point of decision. Shareholders, as such, simply will not be 
consulted. 
That said, when an incorporated social enterprise is closely held, reality 
may contradict statutory form because shareholders and directors will likely 
overlap. Some of the value of centralized management is lost, but greater 
investor control is gained and can be used as an enforcement tool. Through 
their participation in management, these investors will have significant access 
to the decision-making process. They can monitor and compel compliance with 
a mandate to prioritize social mission. At first blush, this seems like good news 
for investor enforcement through management, as most social enterprises will 
be—or at least will start—small.117 Thus far, though, drafters of incorporated 
forms for social enterprises have not envisioned this kind of role for investors 
in closely held entities. Benefit corporation statutes are generally silent on the 
issue.118 When the FPC statute singles out adopting entities with few 
shareholders, it is to limit the disclosure obligations due to them.119 The statute 
neither requires nor exhorts closely held FPC shareholders to enforce social-
good prioritization through their participation in management. 
Specialized form legislation might also carve out a more meaningful 
decision-making role for investors by modeling unincorporated forms, which 
lack the commitment to centralized management. As a default, “[e]ach partner 
has equal rights in the management and conduct of the partnership business”120 
and limited liability companies are managed by their members.121 
Unincorporated social enterprise forms could engage investors in enforcement 
 
 117 See Jim Schorr, Social Enterprise 2.0: Moving Toward a Sustainable Model, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION 
REV., Summer 2006, at 12, 12 (“[T]he vast majority of these [social enterprise] businesses are inherently 
small . . . .”). 
 118 Only a few jurisdictions contemplate closely held benefit corporations in their legislative text. See 805 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/4.05(e) (West Supp. 2012) (providing that closely held benefit corporations must 
designate a party with the “powers, duties, rights, and immunities of a benefit director” among those who act 
as a board); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.10(e) (West Supp. 2012) (similar); see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-
38-120(C) (Supp. 2012) (noting that benefit corporations may be subject to the state’s law governing close 
corporations). 
 119 See CAL. CORP. CODE § 3502(h) (West 2013) (allowing FPCs with fewer than 100 shareholders to 
avoid the statute’s disclosure requirements if two-thirds of the shares vote to waive this obligation). 
 120 REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 401(f) (1997); see also UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 18(e) 
(1914) (providing only slightly different language that “[a]ll partners have equal rights in the management and 
conduct of the partnership business”). 
 121 COX & HAZEN, supra note 73, § 1.11[4], at 31. 
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as conflicts between profit and social good arise in daily decisions. Imagine 
again our clean energy social enterprise’s vendor selection. If incorporated, 
shareholders would not be involved in making this type of decision, except in 
the case when shareholders are also directors. In contrast, partners or LLC 
members engaged in management could weigh in on this choice. 
Importantly, though, investor management in unincorporated business 
entities is a default, not a demand. Where incorporated forms prize centralized 
management, unincorporated ones prize flexibility.122 The L3C and benefit 
LLC follow suit. Investor management remains a waivable default; flexibility 
is their hallmark.123 Without a major deviation from this path, specialized 
unincorporated forms will hold out the possibility of investor enforcement 
through management, but no certainty. 
c. Voting Rights 
Specialized form legislation could also enfranchise investors to enforce a 
mandate to prioritize social good. For example, motivated investors might use 
social-good prioritization as a crucible to determine their favored candidate in 
director elections. Benefit corporation and FPC shareholders elect directors in 
precisely the manner found in for-profit corporations.124 For voting to be an 
effective enforcement tool, however, investors need to vote and they need 
candidate choices. “[T]raditional shareholders wield their voting power 
infrequently at best.”125 Even assuming specialized form investors would vote 
more, only in the rare contested election could votes potentially be used to 
penalize failures to prioritize social good.126 Similar dynamics will occur in a 
social enterprise structured like a manager-managed LLC. 
 
 122 See Brewer, supra note 61, at 680 (noting the attractive “inherent contract-like flexibility” of LLCs); 
David S. Walker, A Consideration of an LLC for a 501(c)(3) Nonprofit Organization, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REV. 627, 652 (2012) (“[A]s is widely known, the limited liability company frees those managing it and 
conducting its business and affairs from the detailed prescriptions and required [corporate] formalities . . . .”). 
 123 See ROBERT LANG, AMS. FOR CMTY. DEV., THE L3C & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (2010), available at 
http://americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/downloads/The%20L3C%20&%20Economic%20Developmen
t.pdf (“The L3C was built on the LLC structure in order to provide the flexibility of membership and 
organization needed to cover a wide variety of social enterprise situations.”); Kelley, supra note 9, at 370–75. 
 124 See COX & HAZEN, supra note 73, § 9.1, at 152 (explaining that shareholders traditionally elect 
directors); id. § 13.17, at 371 (“The prevailing default rule for the election of directors is that directors are 
elected under a plurality voting system . . . .”). 
 125 Lisa M. Fairfax, Achieving the Double Bottom Line: A Framework for Corporations Seeking to 
Deliver Profits and Public Services, 9 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 199, 226 (2004). 
 126 Where shareholders and directors overlap significantly, voting will have little more enforcement 
impact than the participation of investors themselves in decision making.  
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Investors could also use voting on fundamental transactions to enforce 
social-good prioritization. Even though management initiates and negotiates 
major events in the life of an enterprise, legislation often requires investors to 
approve them.127 One can easily imagine fundamental transactions structured 
to abandon pursuit of social good, or rebalance it with profit in a way that 
undermines the social-good prioritization standard. If investors must approve 
these transactions, voting can be used to enforce the priority of social purposes. 
Investors can use their approval rights for legacy protection by refusing to 
approve a dissolution that would snuff out the entity’s social mission or a 
transaction that would diminish or eradicate its commission to social good.128 
That said, voting rights on fundamental transactions will not afford investors 
opportunities to challenge the many interim decisions that trade off profit and 
social good. 
Benefit corporation and FPC statutes subject various fundamental 
transactions to shareholder approval, often by a two-thirds majority.129 Article 
amendments that reprioritize mission, transactions that sell all assets to a for-
profit entity, or deals that merge with one, must all pass muster with 
investors.130 Investors in these forms can, at least in theory, enforce against 
actions that threaten the ultimate existence of their enterprises, and thus their 
commitments to social good. The practical utility of shareholder voting, 
however, may undermine the power of this enforcement tool, and it will apply 
only in endgame situations. 
 
 127 See COX & HAZEN, supra note 73, § 13.1, at 350 (noting one aspect of shareholders’ right to vote “as 
to the making of amendments to the charter and other fundamental changes in the corporate existence”). 
 128 See Robert A. Katz & Antony Page, The Role of Social Enterprise, 35 VT. L. REV. 59, 95–97 (2010) 
(describing the legacy problem as “[t]he risk that the for-profit social enterprise may subordinate social 
mission to profits . . . following a change in ownership” and citing Susan Mac Cormac). 
 129 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 3000(b), 3100(a), 3201, 3301(a)(2) (West 2013); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 14A:18-3(a) (West Supp. 2012). L3C statutes leave LLC default member-approval rights unchanged.  
 130 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 3201; MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. AND ASS’NS §§ 2-604(e), 5-6C-04(b) 
(West Supp. 2012) (noting that “[t]he proposed amendment shall be approved by the stockholders of the 
corporation by the affirmative vote of two thirds of all the votes entitled to be cast on the matter,” which must 
be complied with under section 5-6C-04(b)). This same level of shareholder approval is required for an 
ordinary for-profit to transform into a benefit corporation by charter amendment. See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. 
AND ASS’NS § 5-6C-03(b).  
The California benefit corporation and FPC statutes also provide shareholders with dissenters’ rights. 
See CAL. CORP. CODE § 1300(a); see also id. § 3305 (providing dissenters’ rights under section 1300 in 
transactions converting an FPC into another type of business entity); id. § 14604(d) (granting dissenters’ rights 
on sale or other disposition of all or substantially all of a benefit corporation’s assets). For a discussion 
challenging the utility of dissenters’ rights in this context, see Brakman Reiser, supra note 43.  
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d. Litigation Rights 
Legislation can grant investors standing to litigate nonexistential threats to 
social mission, and it has frequently done so. Of course, the value of litigation 
rights in enforcing social-good prioritization will depend largely on resolving 
the serious fiduciary duty issues addressed above and on courts’ institutional 
competence to judge compliance with a social-good prioritization standard.131 
Assuming these challenges can be met, however, investors will likely have 
standing to enforce them. 
For-profit corporation statutes authorize shareholders to sue fiduciaries 
derivatively on behalf of their corporations by alleging breach of duty.132 Most 
LLC statutes confer similar rights.133 L3C and FPC legislation leaves these 
existing rights essentially undisturbed.134 
Many benefit corporation statutes, however, create a specialized “benefit 
enforcement proceeding.”135 Such proceedings may be brought by the 
corporation or derivatively by a shareholder, director, a percentage of 
beneficial owners, or others the articles identify.136 The statutes often describe 
this new proceeding as an exclusive remedy for challenging benefit directors’ 
unique duties.137 Yet, beyond limiting plaintiffs, benefit legislation contains 
few details on how it will operate. 
 
 131 See supra Part II.B.2–3. 
 132 COX & HAZEN, supra note 73, § 15.2, at 443 (“As a rule, the shareholder’s judicial remedy for 
mismanagement or other wrongful acts of directors, officers, or third parties is by a derivative or representative 
suit on behalf of the corporation.”). 
 133 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 77, § 10:3 (“The derivative remedy is explicitly made available 
by most LLC statutes. Most of these statutes provide for rules similar to those applied to corporate derivative 
suits. Even where the right is not available by statute, courts have recognized the remedy . . . .” (footnotes 
omitted)); see also id. app. 10-2, at 231 (providing state-by-state analysis).  
 134 LLC and Benefit L3C statutes do not address derivative litigation specifically. The FPC does so, but 
applies typical requirements like contemporaneous ownership, demand on the board, and security for 
expenses. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2900. 
 135 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1825 (2013); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156E, § 14 (West Supp. 
2012). 
 136 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-10 (West Supp. 2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-790(B) (West 
Supp. 2012). 
 137 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 14623(a) (“No person may bring an action or assert a claim against a 
benefit corporation or its directors or officers under this chapter except in a benefit enforcement proceeding.”); 
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-790(A) (“The duties of directors and officers under this article, the obligation of a 
benefit corporation to prepare and make available the annual benefit report . . . and the general and any special 
public benefit purpose of a benefit corporation may be enforced only in a benefit enforcement proceeding.”). 
For additional discussion of the benefit enforcement proceeding, see Brakman Reiser, supra note 25, at 
605–06; Callison, supra note 38, at 12–13, 28; and Murray, supra note 38, at 34–35. 
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If these claims will operate on a footing similar to for-profit shareholder 
derivative suits, obstacles to investor enforcement are numerous and well-
known.138 Derivative plaintiffs must often survive challenging demand 
conditions, pleading standards, and bond requirements.139 Moreover, they must 
overcome the collective action problem inherent in derivative litigation. When 
each shareholder stands to gain only a few dollars or pennies, while her shares 
will increase in value after a successful suit, her incentive to litigate is low. 
Plaintiffs’ attorneys can help overcome this collective action problem when 
their fees can be paid out of an aggregated recovery. Yet it is doubtful that 
lawyers will solve benefit corporation investors’ coordination difficulties 
because the redress available through such suits is quite limited. Either in their 
sections on director obligations or the provisions on benefit enforcement 
proceedings, benefit corporation statutes severely limit directors’ monetary 
liability for failures to “create a general or specific public benefit.”140 Perhaps 
directors may still be held liable for failure to pursue such benefits, but it is 
difficult to imagine how such damages would be calculated and the statutes are 
silent on this question. Without money damages to fund contingency fee 
litigation (and possibly even with it) or provisions for attorneys’ fees, it is 
unlikely an aggressive plaintiffs bar will develop in this area. 
e. Incentives 
Finally, even assuming the content of fiduciary duty could be sufficiently 
settled to operate as a real constraint and that the information, management, 
voting, and litigation rights investors possess are sufficient, they may lack 
adequate incentives to police social-good prioritization effectively. Investors’ 
preferences will not always track social-good priority precisely. We can 
assume that when an investor chooses to put her resources into an entity 
adopting a specialized form with a clear social-good prioritization standard, 
she shares this preference.141 But investors’ preferences are not static. 
 
 138 See Fairfax, supra note 125, at 221–25 (describing how “procedural and substantive rules blunt the 
force of [shareholder litigation]”). 
 139 Id. 
 140 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 14623(c) (emphasis added); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-788(C)(2) (similar); 
see also Murray, supra note 38, at 34–35. 
 141 See Alicia E. Plerhoples, Can an Old Dog Learn New Tricks? Applying Traditional Corporate Law 
Principles to New Social Enterprise Legislation, 13 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 221, 252–54 (2012). 
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Economic fortunes may turn and investors who once were pleased to give up 
some financial returns for psychic ones may no longer be willing to do so.142 
Additionally, unless transfer is restricted by organizational form or 
contractual choice, investors may be persuaded to sell to others with differing 
views—at least as long as buyers believe they can change the entity’s 
course.143 Different statutory formulations allow such buyers more or less 
challenging exit routes. Under benefit corporation and FPC statutes, buyers 
will have to vote in friendly directors and persuade two-thirds of the shares to 
abandon social-good prioritization.144 For L3Cs, the course is far smoother. All 
its managers (or owners instructing managers) must do is abandon their 
charitable or educational purposes, and the entity instantaneously transforms 
into an ordinary LLC.145 Neither disillusioned investors, nor those with a 
windfall in their sights, are good candidates to police deviations from social-
good prioritization. 
Even for investors who remain committed to prioritizing social good, when 
faced with a social enterprise veering off the rails, active enforcement may be a 
very unattractive option. If the cost of enforcement activity is high, as will 
often be the case if litigation is required, investors might rather give up on the 
social mission of a given entity. If coordination problems keep them from 
working together to bear these high costs, individual investors might prefer to 
exit by liquidating their positions and looking for new socially responsible 
investments. Even if they do not exit by cashing out, investors will not 
necessarily opt to enforce. If the social enterprise has become more thoroughly 
profit seeking, they might opt to stay invested, enjoy the greater profits, and 
contribute these to other social-good-producing entities. 
2. Non-Investor Stakeholder Enforcement 
Of course, investors are not the only stakeholder group that specialized 
forms might recruit to enforce social-good prioritization. Employees, 
 
 142 Tyler noted these potential problems undermine the ability of investors to enforce L3C obligations 
alone. See Tyler, supra note 24, at 155–56. He argued, however, that sufficient additional enforcement can be 
provided by civil or criminal suits by attorneys general alleging fraud or misrepresentation, reinvigorated ultra 
vires claims, or veil piercing, and opposesd public regulation or enforcement of social enterprises. Id. at 156–
57. He also noted that “[s]uccess [d]oes [n]ot [n]eed to be [r]emedied.” Id. at 158.  
 143 Social enterprises might be particularly ripe takeover targets; so long as insurgents can re-chart the 
entities’ dual mission course toward profit alone, they can quickly cut costs and reap large gains. See 
Plerhoples, supra note 141, at 233–36. 
 144 See Brakman Reiser & Dean, supra note 97 (manuscript at 14).  
 145 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
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consumers, beneficiaries, or even the public at large could also be deployed. 
For any private stakeholder to enforce social-good prioritization, either 
individually or as part of a coordinated group, she will need at least three 
things. First, she must have access to information about the social enterprise’s 
outcomes and decision making to understand if enforcement is needed. 
Second, she requires tools such as management, voting, or litigation rights to 
raise challenges when she feels the entity has gone off track. Third, like all 
other potential enforcers, she needs appropriate incentives to engage actively in 
enforcement rather than sitting passively on the sidelines. 
The current social enterprise forms provide relatively little instruction on 
how to empower and utilize non-investor stakeholders in enforcement, as none 
go beyond providing these groups with information. The benefit corporation 
and FPC forms’ public disclosure requirements offer essentially the same data 
to all stakeholder groups.146 The L3C contains no disclosure requirements, and 
so in its own way it also provides informational parity. No existing form 
equips non-investor stakeholders with management, voting, or litigation rights 
to enforce social-good prioritization. In fact, statutes creating these forms often 
expressly state their intention not to grant standing to groups beyond 
investors.147 Thus, the task here is to envision creatively how an organizational 
form might use these other individuals and groups with a stake in the social 
enterprise as enforcement resources. 
In terms of information, social enterprise employees will have the 
advantage of proximity, and often expertise, over all other stakeholder 
groups—at times even over investors. Employees can have unparalleled access 
to more detailed data, organizational leaders of whom they might ask 
 
 146 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 14630 (West 2013); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156E, §§ 15–16 (West 
Supp. 2012). Hawaii requires benefit corporations to make drafts of their benefit reports available for a sixty-
day public comment period. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D-11(b) (2012). 
 147 See, e.g., 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/4.01(d) (West Supp. 2012) (“A director does not have a duty 
to a person that is a beneficiary of the general public benefit purpose or a specific public benefit purpose of a 
benefit corporation arising from the status of the person as a beneficiary.”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156E, 
§ 10(e) (“A director shall not have a fiduciary duty to a person that is a beneficiary of the general or specific 
public benefit purposes of a benefit corporation arising from the status of the person as a beneficiary.”). 
  Recent experimental findings suggest that empowering shareholders alone to engage in enforcement 
will undermine fiduciaries’ willingness to respond to the concerns of other constituencies, even if legislation 
directs fiduciaries to consider them. See, e.g., Sven Fischer et al., Cui Bono, Benefit Corporation? An 
Experiment Inspired by Social Enterprise Legislation in Germany and the US 26 (Max Planck Inst. for 
Research on Collective Goods, Working Paper No. Bonn 2013/4, 2013), available at 
ssrn.com/abstract=2226382 (suggesting enforcement by shareholders alone creates an insufficient “incentive 
structure [that] deserve[s] more careful attention by policy-makers”). 
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questions, and their own knowledge about operations and industry norms. 
Consumers’ and beneficiaries’ positions as users of the social enterprise’s 
product or service might give them special insights into its features and 
ultimate quality, but little information on how these outcomes are reached or 
the entity’s internal operations. The public will be at a considerable 
informational deficit relative to other stakeholder groups, but might develop 
views of a social enterprise’s performance from passing observations or media 
coverage. In a benefit corporation or FPC, employees can use their differential 
access and expertise to enhance the value of the significant disclosures 
available to all constituencies. The L3C’s lack of disclosure requirements will 
accentuate the information gap between employees and other non-investor 
stakeholders. To narrow this gap, specialized forms might require additional 
disclosures to consumers, beneficiaries, or the public—or provide them with 
rights to inquire. Of course, additional reporting burdens will also impose 
greater costs on adopting entities, perhaps undermining social entrepreneurs’ 
enthusiasm for specialized forms. 
Assuming stakeholders are informed, they still cannot enforce social-good 
prioritization without management, voting, litigation, or other rights to act. 
Employees’ positions can provide them with tools for enforcement regardless 
of whether additional ones are made available by their enterprise’s 
organizational form. Depending on their level of authority, employees may 
participate in making precisely those midstream and endgame decisions that pit 
profit and social good against each other. In doing so, they may voice their 
opinions on the need to prioritize social mission and impact outcomes. A social 
enterprise form could impose additional participation rights for employees, 
consumers, beneficiaries, or the public. These stakeholders might be granted 
dedicated board seats or management authority, approval or veto rights over 
existential or even more mundane decisions, or standing to sue for redress. 
Again, such innovations would not come without costs. Empowered 
stakeholders could become unbearable nags or nuisance-suit plaintiffs.148 
Authorizing broad swaths of non-investor stakeholders to challenge the actions 
of entities adopting specialized forms could make these forms prohibitively 
unattractive to social enterprise founders. Thus far, specialized social 
enterprise forms have made the call that these costs and risks are not worth 
bearing. They impose only public disclosure obligations, if that. Additional 
enforcement tools for non-investor stakeholders have been squarely rejected. 
 
 148 See Callison, supra note 38, at 28. 
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Even if future legislation were to provide these tools to stakeholders, these 
groups will often lack incentives to enforce social-good prioritization. Some 
may be highly motivated, even passionate, about their entity’s social mission. 
But there are good reasons not to rely too heavily on their willingness to 
enforce social-good prioritization, especially if enforcement efforts will be 
costly. Employees and customers might have begun working for and buying 
from a social enterprise precisely because of its social mission. Yet, they may 
stand to gain financially by ignoring its failure to prioritize social good, as 
higher profits increase wages and reduce prices.149 Beneficiaries and the public 
might be less conflicted in their motivations to enforce social-good 
prioritization, but are probably even less likely to take on its costs. And all of 
these groups will be challenged by coordination problems. 
To activate non-investor stakeholder groups to enforce social-good 
prioritization, specialized form legislation would need to impose potentially 
onerous disclosure requirements to inform them. It would also have to 
empower them with strong enforcement tools to deploy, and may need to help 
them overcome serious incentive problems. This is a tall order. Furthermore, 
empowering a broad range of stakeholders to challenge the actions of social 
enterprises and their leaders may raise the specter of strike suits by 
troublemakers and make specialized forms less appealing to social enterprise 
founders in the first place. 
B. Enforcement from Outside 
Legislation might also look outside social enterprises for enforcement of a 
social-good prioritization standard. A public regulator could enforce this 
mandate, much as state attorneys general and state and federal tax authorities 
police the missions of nonprofits. Alternatively, legislation might incentivize 
private parties to create entities engaged in this regulatory project. 
1. Public Enforcement 
The major advantage to public enforcement lies in its public nature. A 
public regulator has a mandate to speak for the people writ large and for the 
good of society. Again, charity enforcement provides a nice analogy. There, 
state attorneys general “represent the public’s interest in the proper use of the 
 
 149 See Dees & Anderson, supra note 7, at 9–12 (addressing the concern that customers and employees 
may ultimately push social enterprises away from their social missions); see also Battilana et al., supra note 9, 
at 54 (describing the challenge of maintaining organizational culture and developing talent in a hybrid entity). 
REISER GALLEYSPROOFS2 6/11/2013 9:20 AM 
2013] THEORIZING FORMS FOR SOCIAL ENTERPRISE 721 
funds raised and held by charitable organizations.”150 By the same token, a 
public regulator could vindicate a societal claim to require social enterprises to 
prioritize social good. The United Kingdom’s dedicated regulator for its 
specialized social enterprise form, the community interest company (CIC), 
follows this model.151 In a CIC, legislation specifically prioritizes the public 
benefit (or, in their words, community benefit) purposes of adopting social 
enterprises.152 The CIC Regulator is a dedicated agency responsible for 
determining whether applying entities qualify as CICs, and if established ones 
remain so, through review of annual disclosures and investigation to ensure 
compliance with community benefit requirements, limits on dividends to 
shareholders, and the partial asset lock imposed by the CIC form.153 
The public nature of government regulators could also raise potential 
obstacles to their use in social enterprise enforcement. A motivated and 
sufficiently resourced regulator should engage in significant enforcement when 
social enterprises fail to pursue their espoused public good. Yet, public 
regulators’ public focus could also cause them to overemphasize the social 
mission of social enterprises, undermining social enterprises’ pursuit of profits 
for shareholders. Again taking the CIC as an example, critics have argued that 
the Regulator set dividend caps too low, overemphasizing community benefit 
and making the shares insufficiently attractive to investors.154 A focus on 
social good should not be an insurmountable obstacle to public regulation. 
Investor interests should be more than sufficient to train the focus of social 
enterprise leaders on profit goals. Further, specialized entities should be 
 
 150 See NAT’L ASS’N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL: POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
183–94 (Lynne M. Ross ed., 1990) (explaining the rationale for the role of public regulators in charity 
enforcement). State charity regulators echo this concern for vindicating the public interest in their own 
statements of purpose. See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, CAL. OFF. ATT’Y GEN., 
http://oag.ca.gov/charities/faq#c5 (last visited May 10, 2013) (“The Attorney General represents the public 
beneficiaries of charities, who cannot sue in their own right.”); Reviewing Nonprofits and Charitable 
Trusts/Gifts, TENN. OFF. ATT’Y GEN. & REP., http://www.tn.gov/attorneygeneral/nonprofit/nonprofit.html (last 
visited May 10, 2013) (describing its role in representing “the interest of charitable beneficiaries, potential 
charitable beneficiaries and the people of the State of Tennessee”). 
 151 See DEP’T FOR BUS. INNOVATION & SKILLS, REGULATOR OF COMMUNITY INTEREST COMPANIES: 
STATUS, ROLE, FUNCTION AND LOCATION 5 (2010), available at http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/cicregulator/ 
docs/leaflets/10-1390-community-interest-companies-regulators-status-role-function-and-location-guide.pdf.  
 152 See DEP’T FOR BUS. INNOVATION & SKILLS, OFFICE OF THE REGULATOR OF COMMUNITY INTEREST 
COMPANIES: INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE NOTES 10 (2012), available at http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/ 
cicregulator/docs/guidance/12-1333-community-interest-companies-guidance-chapter-1-introduction.pdf 
(explaining that “CICs are intended to use their assets, income and profits for the benefit of the community 
they are formed to serve” and describing their asset-lock and dividend-cap features). 
 153 See DEP’T FOR BUS. INNOVATION & SKILLS, supra note 151.  
 154 See Brakman Reiser, supra note 35, at 635–36. 
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permitted to pursue profit, but not to prioritize it. Thus, the accountability 
lapses needing enforcement attention arise on the social-good side of the social 
enterprise equation, where public regulators’ attention to social mission would 
be a good fit.155 
The more serious challenge to public enforcement is a lack of resources. In 
these times of fiscal austerity, states are very unlikely to create and fund new 
regulatory agencies. Legislatures might add to attorneys general’s portfolios, 
and particularly to their charities bureaus, the duty of ensuring that social 
enterprises prioritize social good. After all, these regulators have useful 
expertise in enforcing obligations to pursue public benefits in the related area 
of charity enforcement.156 Unless such a delegation of authority is 
accompanied by appropriation of greater resources, however, it will lead to 
very little social enterprise enforcement activity or social enterprise 
enforcement only at the expense of charity enforcement. The understaffing and 
lack of resources in charities bureaus has been discussed by virtually every 
commentator in the field and is, by now, widely accepted as both problematic 
and unlikely to change.157 Attorneys general simply lack the capacity to do 
more enforcement without greater resources. 
In various campaigns to pass L3C and benefit corporation legislation, state 
charities bureaus made these very objections. Indeed, Hawaii’s benefit 
corporation legislation includes an express disavowal of regulatory 
involvement, stating that “[e]nforcement of [adopting entities’] responsibilities 
[to operate in a socially and environmentally sustainable manner] comes not 
from governmental oversight, but rather from new provisions on transparency 
and accountability.”158 An interesting counterexample, however, can be seen in 
Illinois’s experience with the L3C. The Illinois L3C statute designates L3Cs 
and their CEOs, directors, and managers as “trustees” under the state’s 
Charitable Trust Act.159 This designation triggers application of registration 
 
 155 But see Tyler, supra note 24, at 151–54 (describing his opposition to such public regulation of L3Cs, 
primarily due to concerns it would inappropriately undercut their profit-making purposes and those of their 
investors). 
 156 See supra text accompanying note 150. 
 157 See, e.g., FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 51, at 445–46. 
 158 HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D-1 (2012). The Hawaii statute also provides that a benefit corporation’s 
annual report must include: “A statement that . . . the sustainable business corporation and its activities are 
subject to the oversight of the board of the sustainable business corporation and are not subject to the direct 
oversight, regulation, or endorsement of any governmental body.” Id. § 420D-11(a)(8). 
 159 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/1-26(d) (West Supp. 2012) (“Any company operating or holding itself 
out as a low-profit limited liability company in Illinois, any company formed as a low-profit limited liability 
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and reporting requirements under Illinois charity law and empowers the 
attorney general to take enforcement action against L3Cs formed there.160 
Although other state attorneys general might argue that social enterprises 
adopting specialized forms come within their purview due to their control of 
assets dedicated to charitable purposes, thus far Illinois’s direct approach is 
exceptional.161 
Some of the understaffing of charity enforcement at the state level is 
ameliorated by the overlapping jurisdiction of the Federal Internal Revenue 
Service.162 The federal role there stems from charities’ desire to obtain the 
favorable tax status federal law affords to nonprofits that meet its eligibility 
requirements.163 At present, however, specialized forms for social enterprise 
are an exclusively state-level phenomenon with no targeted federal benefits.164 
Legislation has been introduced in Congress to bless or “fast track” entities 
organized as L3Cs as eligible recipients of tax-favored foundation PRIs.165 So 
 
company under this Act, and any chief operating officer, director, or manager of any such company is a 
‘trustee’ as defined in Section 3 of the Charitable Trust Act.”). 
 160 See MARC J. LANE, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE: EMPOWERING MISSION-DRIVEN ENTREPRENEURS 102–06 
(2011) (describing Illinois charity law that will apply to “any entity with charitable purposes”); see also Tyler, 
supra note 24, at 151 n.144 (expressing serious concerns that the Illinois approach undermines the dual-
purpose concept of an L3C). 
 161 Some benefit entity statutes require filing of annual reports with a state official, but this is purely 
ministerial. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156E, §§ 15–16 (West Supp. 2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 14A:18-11(d)(1) (West Supp. 2012); see also HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D-13 (specifically noting that the 
state’s involvement with entity filings is “[m]inisterial”).  
 162 See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 51, at 377 (“[S]ince the 1950s the regulatory power of the federal 
government has been expanded so that it is effectively the primary source of [charity] regulation, extending to 
matters that had previously been the exclusive province of the states and, in many instances, preempting state 
regulation by conditioning tax exemption upon compliance with federal standards of behavior.”); see also 
James J. Fishman, Stealth Preemption: The IRS’s Nonprofit Corporate Governance Initiative, 29 VA. TAX 
REV. 545 (2010) (challenging the increased IRS role in regulating charity governance based on federalism 
concerns).  
 163 See Fishman, supra note 162, at 549–51 (describing the IRS’s role in an article critiquing the Service 
for overstepping it). 
 164 For analysis of whether social enterprise should receive federal tax advantages, see Joseph M. Binder, 
Note, A Tax Analysis of the Emerging Class of Hybrid Entities, 78 BROOK. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013); Lloyd 
Hitoshi Mayer & Joseph Ganahl, Taxing Social Enterprise (Jan. 14, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with author). 
 165 See Philanthropic Facilitation Act, H.R. 3420, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011); Kelly Kleiman, “L3C” Spells 
“Caveat Emptor,” STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. (Mar. 18, 2011), http://www.ssireview.org/blog/entry/l3c_ 
spells_caveat_emptor (noting that scholars and lawyers “point out that the IRS has not yet issued (and does not 
seem inclined to create) a rule awarding automatic program-related investment status to any investment in an 
L3C”); Daniel S. Kleinberger, The Fatal Design Defects of L3Cs, NONPROFIT Q. (June 21, 2010), http:// 
www.nonprofitquarterly.org/management/5501-the-fatal-design-defects-of-l3cs.html (“Congress has not 
created a special category of PRI treatment for low-profit limited liability companies and appears unlikely to 
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far it has gained little traction, and its future success is unlikely. The IRS does 
not rely on an entity’s state-created legal form to drive tax determinations.166 
And, in these times of budget deficits and fiscal crisis, Congress will not be 
dispensing broad new tax benefits to social enterprises anytime soon. Without 
such an improbable expansion of federal tax benefits, there is simply no 
relevant overlapping federal tax jurisdiction to engage in public regulation of 
social enterprise. 
In sum, while public enforcement might desirably focus on the social 
mission of social enterprises, it is an unrealistic solution. State governments 
will not be keen to create and fund new agencies. Most attorneys general will 
have little appetite for adding responsibilities to their already overloaded and 
understaffed charities bureaus. And, using the Federal IRS for this purpose 
would require far-fetched, new authorizations and significant investment. To 
create a successful legal form for social enterprise, legislatures must look 
elsewhere to ensure social-good prioritization will be enforced. 
2. Private Regulators 
A more plausible course would be for specialized legal forms to create a 
market for private, third-party entities to serve as regulators. Legislation 
enabling specialized forms can chart the contours of this enforcement role. 
Private regulators might be engaged solely to develop and disseminate 
information about social enterprises and their practices or to engage more 
directly in enforcement themselves. The benefit entity forms attempt to harness 
the energies of third-party regulators, albeit in a limited fashion. Other 
techniques remain untested. 
a. Information Forcing 
An information-forcing take on outsourced regulation tasks private 
regulators with distributing information about social enterprises adopting 
specialized legal forms. For example, private regulators might publicize 
disclosures organizations produce, offer comparative and evaluative analysis of 
this data, develop and circulate best practices, or some combination of these 
options. They could also work as midstream monitors, reviewing entities using 
the forms at intervals and publishing results. This role for third-party regulators 
 
do so.”); see also Schmidt, supra note 61, at 170–71 (describing an earlier version of the bill prior to its 
introduction in Congress). 
 166 See Kleinberger, supra note 27, at 905–07. 
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asks them only to arm other public or private actors with the information those 
parties need to engage in more direct enforcement. 
The benefit corporation and benefit LLC forms rely on private third parties 
for enforcement in a limited information-forcing role. As noted earlier, to form 
as a benefit corporation or benefit LLC, a social enterprise must assert that it is 
formed for a general public benefit “as measured by a third-party standard.”167 
At a minimum, benefit entity legislation secures the quality of the standards 
third parties produce by requiring them to be independent168 and transparent.169 
Standing alone, these requirements are insufficient. Typical profit-seeking 
corporations other than truly heinous polluters likely create “a material positive 
impact on society and the environment”170 by doing business as usual. A third 
party could promulgate and publicly disclose a qualifying standard requiring 
only that a company employ one or more members of the community, pay 
assessed taxes, and avoid fines or penalties for environmental harms for one 
year. Without oversight of standard setters, it is easy to imagine standard 
setters going further, offering standards requiring only a small donation to a 
conservation organization, or the standard setter itself. So long as a benefit 
entity is unrelated to such a lax standard setter, and the standard is publicly 
available, a company with a quite limited commitment to “social good” could 
adopt and self-assess against this low hurdle. 
Jurisdictions with later-adopted benefit corporation statutes frequently and 
helpfully impose additional requirements for third-party standards.171 About 
 
 167 VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-782 (West Supp. 2012); accord LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:1803(A)(6), 
:1811(A) (2013); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW §§ 1702(b), 1706(a) (McKinney Supp. 2012). 
 168 A benefit corporation or LLC cannot utilize a standard created by an entity with a “material 
relationship with [the] benefit corporation or any of its subsidiaries . . . either directly or as a shareholder, 
partner, member or other owner or a director, officer or other manager of an entity that has a material 
relationship with the benefit corporation or any of its subsidiaries.” N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-1 (West Supp. 
2011); see, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-01(e)(1) (West Supp. 2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 
11A, § 21.03(a)(8)(A) (West Supp. 2012). 
 169 For a standard to be acceptable, the following information about the standard must be publicly 
available: “(a) The factors considered when measuring the performance of a business; (b) The relative 
weightings of those factors; and (c) The identity of the persons that develop and control changes to the 
standard and the process by which those changes are made.” VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-782; accord HAW. REV. 
STAT. § 420D-12(3)(A)–(E) (2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.03(a)(8)(B)(i)–(iii). 
 170 This language is used to describe the general public benefit that benefit corporations must pursue. See, 
e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-782. 
 171 These standards appear to derive from the Model Benefit Corporation Statute. See Model Benefit 
Corporation Legislation, supra note 36, § 102(a). For clarity, please note that this model was promulgated by a 
group of benefit corporation advocates, rather than a bar association or general law reform group.  
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half of them demand that third-party standards be “comprehensive.”172 These 
comprehensiveness standards are variously expressed. Their common core 
demands that an acceptable standard considers the impact of entities reviewed 
under it on the range of considerations described in the statutes’ standard of 
conduct for directors.173 Thus, comprehensiveness injects some substantive 
dimension into the statutory floor, but it is also subject to the “too many 
masters” critique described above.174 At least four jurisdictions with 
comprehensiveness requirements also require third-party standards to be 
“credible.”175 Credibility means standard setters “access[] necessary and 
appropriate expertise to assess overall corporate social and environmental 
performance” and “use[] a balanced multi-stakeholder approach, including a 
public comment period of at least 30 days to develop the standard.”176 
Comprehensiveness and credibility are welcome additions to the bare-bones 
requirements of independence and transparency, and may well encourage third 
parties to set standards meaningfully requiring adopting entities to “do both” 
profit and social good. They do not, however, require standards to mandate 
social-good prioritization. Nor do any of the statutes provide for oversight or 
enforcement of the standards that third parties promulgate. 
Moreover, it is worth noting again that third-party standard setters 
themselves need never review those entities that take their standards on board. 
Rather, benefit entity statutes incentivize third parties only to develop and 
publicize standards for public benefit and positive societal and environmental 
impact. These standards then serve as metrics for organizational self-
assessment. Social enterprises seeking recognition as benefit corporations or 
 
 172 Compare CAL. CORP. CODE § 14601(g)(1) (West 2013) (including a comprehensiveness requirement), 
HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D-12(1) (same), 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/1.10 (West Supp. 2012) (same), LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1803(A)(12)(a) (including a comprehensiveness requirement, though not styled as 
such), MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156E, § 2 (West Supp. 2012) (same), and S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-38-
130(A)(9)(a) (Supp. 2012) (including a comprehensiveness requirement), with MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & 
ASS’NS § 5-6C-01(e) (requiring only transparency and independence), N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-1 (same), 
N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1702(g) (same), VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-782 (same), and VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, 
§ 21.03(a)(8) (same). 
 173 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D-12(1) (requiring a third-party standard to be “[c]omprehensive in 
its assessment of the effect of the business and its operations upon the interests listed in section 420D-6(a) 
[describing the ‘[s]tandard of conduct for directors’]”). Not every comprehensiveness requirement sweeps this 
broadly, however. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1803(A)(12)(a) (requiring a third-party standard to be 
“[c]omprehensive in that it assesses the effect of the corporation and its operations in producing general public 
benefit and any specific public benefit specified in the articles”). 
 174 See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text. 
 175 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156E, § 2; see also CAL. CORP. CODE § 14601(g)(3); 805 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. 40/1.10; S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-38-130(A)(9)(a). 
 176 See, e.g., 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/1.10; see also, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156E, § 23.  
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benefit LLCs will choose among the third-party standards available, but need 
not engage the third-party standard setters to apply them. 
This limited information-forcing role for private regulators makes them 
merely one early link in a long enforcement chain. Under the benefit entity 
statutes, disclosures pegged to third-party standards give shareholders 
information to use in enforcement activity. Then, the benefit entity forms rely 
on the market to monitor adopting entities and the third-party standards they 
select. The legislation assumes there will be a set of highly engaged users for 
the information disclosed by adopting entities. 
This assumption is dubious. It requires a set of users that is motivated to 
seek out and analyze information about the social enterprise with which they 
are considering some involvement. But, their appetite for information must 
extend still further. They must take the additional step of investigating the 
quality of the third-party standard their chosen social enterprise has elected to 
employ. And, they must digest and assess the self-evaluation their chosen 
social enterprise has undertaken and disclosed, using the third-party standards 
as a metric. This is a great deal to ask even of investors and employees, let 
alone consumers. Studies suggest donors will not necessarily use 
accountability information available regarding charities to which they are 
considering making a donation.177 To the extent these data are analogous, the 
enforcement value of this particular information-forcing model is questionable. 
Third-party standard setters with no baseline mandate to demand social-good 
prioritization may simply shift the accountability problem to a different level. 
 
 177 See, e.g., HOPE CONSULTING, MONEY FOR GOOD: THE US MARKET FOR IMPACT INVESTMENTS AND 
CHARITABLE GIFTS FROM INDIVIDUAL DONORS AND INVESTORS 8, 19–21 (2010), available at http://www. 
hopeconsulting.us/pdf/Money%20for%20Good_Final.pdf (reporting findings from a study of charitable donors 
that “[f]ew donors do research before they give, and those that do look to the nonprofit itself to provide simple 
information about efficiency and effectiveness”); Katie Cunningham & Marc Ricks, Why Measure, STAN. SOC. 
INNOVATION REV., Summer 2004, at 44, 46 (finding negligible interest in performance measures in a study of 
donors); William F. Meehan III et al., Investing in Society, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV., Spring 2004, at 35, 
36 (describing studies and comments indicating donors do not investigate the governance and finances of 
organizations before donating to them); Margaret F. Sloan, The Effects of Nonprofit Accountability Ratings on 
Donor Behavior, 38 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 220, 229 (2009) (reporting study finding that a 
positive accountability rating resulted in a statistically significant increase in donations to a nonprofit, but that 
negative ratings appeared not to impact donors’ contributions); Do Donors Care Whether Nonprofits Are Any 
Good?, TACTICAL PHILANTHROPY (June 8, 2012, 8:30 AM), http://www.tacticalphilanthropy.com/2010/06/do-
donors-care-whether-nonprofits-are-any-good/ (reporting on a U.K. poll showing “68% of people would 
switch their donations to another charity if they found the one they were supporting was performing badly,” 
and yet “68% of people think that an independent [charity] rating system would not affect their giving 
decisions”). 
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And all of this is a prerequisite to engaging in any kind of enforcement 
activity. 
Even in the attenuated role they play in benefit entity legislation, the 
quality of the standards private regulators produce and circulate is important. 
Thus far, specialized form legislation stewards the quality of these standards 
by requiring independence and transparency, as well as sometimes 
comprehensiveness and credibility.178 Future legislation would be improved by 
injecting social-good prioritization as a baseline. This additional content, 
though, may exacerbate the problem with declining to oversee the standard 
setters. And, lawmakers will likely be just as loathe to appropriate resources 
for monitoring private regulators as they are to fund public ones directly. 
b. Direct Enforcement 
Another approach would authorize private regulators to engage in direct 
enforcement. Third-party regulators could certify entities as initially qualified 
to adopt a specialized legal form, applying their own or statutorily determined 
standards. These gate-keeping entities could also monitor social enterprises 
over time. Should an entity initially qualify to use the specialized form but 
over time fail to live up to its initial promise, private regulators could be 
empowered to revoke access. 
Legislation in many fields empowers private regulatory bodies to certify 
and monitor the bona fides of governmentally recognized or benefitted entities. 
State legislatures rely on certifying agencies like the Joint Commission on 
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) to qualify hospitals and 
other health care providers to offer various services and to participate in state-
financing schemes.179 The United States Department of Education recognizes 
many private accrediting agencies to certify institutions of higher education to 
participate in federal financial aid programs.180 Both operate on a continuing 
basis and loss of accreditation will often bring with it a loss of recognition by 
government agencies and programs. Looking abroad, the Philippines has long 
delegated to the Philippine Council for NGO Certification responsibility for 
 
 178 See supra notes 170–77. 
 179 See State Recognition Details, JOINT COMMISSION, http://www.jointcommission.org/state_recognition/ 
state_recognition_details.aspx?ps=100 (last visited May 10, 2013) (providing a comprehensive list of 
programs for which JCAHO accreditation is required or permitted). 
 180 See Accreditation in the United States, U.S. DEPARTMENT EDUC., http://www2.ed.gov/admins/finaid/ 
accred/accreditation_pg9.html (last modified Feb. 12, 2013) (listing accrediting agencies qualifying 
postsecondary schools for Title IV participation). 
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qualifying its charities to receive government recognition and tax-favored 
status.181 
None of the currently available legal forms for social enterprise go this far 
in empowering private regulators, but such a tack remains possible. In fact, 
authorizing private entities to qualify and police social enterprises that adopt 
specialized forms would do more to encourage the formation of private 
regulators than does the limited information-forcing role they play under 
benefit entity schemes. These efforts give only a slight nudge to this market, as 
they require adopting entities to utilize third-party standards, but do not require 
third parties to apply them. Once a would-be benefit corporation or benefit 
LLC acquires the third party’s standards, the social enterprise must apply the 
standard to itself. Accessing such standards should not be difficult or 
expensive because they must be made public to meet the statutory requirement 
of transparency.182 
Standards are generally nonrivalrous goods—consumption of them by one 
user does not leave any less for another.183 Requiring publication of standards 
makes them nonexcludable as well: the very definition of a public good that 
competitive markets tend to under-produce.184 Standard setters will be better 
able to earn a return on the investments required to generate a useful standard 
if hopeful adopters must come to them to obtain or retain certification. Carving 
out a more direct and forceful role for private regulators could, therefore, make 
the business of private regulation itself more attractive and sustainable. 
Of course, the fact that purveyors of social enterprise standards already 
exist suggests that there may be successful models for private standard setters, 
even if they do not control access to specialized forms. B Lab is perhaps the 
 
 181 See The PCNC Public Accountability System, PHILIPPINE COUNCIL FOR NGO CERTIFICATION, 
http://www.pcnc.com.ph/pas.php (last visited May 10, 2013); see also Mark Sidel, The Promise and Limits of 
Collective Action for Nonprofit Self-Regulation: Evidence from Asia, 39 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR 
Q. 1039, 1047–49 (2010) (describing the PCNC’s emergence in a piece placing it within a comparative 
context); Mark Sidel, The Guardians Guarding Themselves: A Comparative Perspective on Nonprofit Self-
Regulation, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 803, 823–25 (2005) (similar). 
 182 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D-12(3)(A)–(E) (2012); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1702(g)(2)(A)–(C) 
(McKinney Supp. 2012). 
 183 See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 42 (3d ed. 2000) (explaining 
“nonrivalrous consumption” as existing where consumption “by one person does not leave less for any other 
consumer”); see also RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 17 (1982) (terming this quality “jointness of 
supply”); Mary Kay Gugerty & Aseem Prakash, Voluntary Regulation of NGOs and Nonprofits: An 
Introduction to the Club Framework, in VOLUNTARY REGULATION OF NGOS AND NONPROFITS, supra note 90, 
at 3, 19 (describing the need for standard-setting clubs to create excludable benefits). 
 184 See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 183, at 42–43; HARDIN, supra note 183, at 17. 
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most important case to examine. B Lab is a nonprofit entity that has granted 
“B” certification to 610 entities meeting its standards for “us[ing] the power of 
business to solve social and environmental problems.”185 A company begins 
the B certification process by completing a self-assessment of its social and 
environmental impact using B Lab’s “B Impact Assessment” tool.186 It also 
must adopt changes to its organizational documents that permit fiduciaries to 
consider stakeholder interests in making decisions.187 Once these changes are 
made, and the assessment and documentation have been reviewed by B Lab 
personnel, applicants with sufficiently high scores may license the trademarked 
“B” designation.188 They also become part of the B Corp community with 
access to discounted services and a supportive group of like-minded 
companies.189 B Lab also maintains an ongoing monitoring process, auditing 
ten percent of its certified entities each year.190 
B Lab was intimately involved with efforts to draft and promote state 
benefit corporation legislation,191 even though these statutes require neither 
certification by B Lab nor even the use of B Lab’s specific standards. If B Lab, 
one of the major forces behind the benefit corporation and benefit LLC 
legislation, is not pushing for a more potent role in the social enterprise 
 
 185 CERTIFIED B CORP., http://www.bcorporation.net/ (last visited May 10, 2013) (noting it has certified 
744 B Corporations, representing $4.2 billion in revenues and 60 industries). 
 186 See How to Become a B Corp, CERTIFIED B CORP., http://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-corp/ 
how-to-become-a-b-corp (last visited May 10, 2013). 
 187 See Protect Your Mission, CERTIFIED B CORP., http://www.bcorporation.net/become/legal (last visited 
May 10, 2013). 
 188 See How to Become a B Corp, supra note 186. 
 189 See Why Become a B Corp?, CERTIFIED B CORP., http://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-corp/why-
become-a-b-corp (last visited May 10, 2013). By becoming a B Corp., an entity can “[s]ave [m]oney and 
[a]ccess [s]ervices” through group discounts, id., and help lead a movement to “redefine success in business.” 
Why B Corps Matter, CERTIFIED B CORP., http://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/why-b-corps-matter 
(last visited May 10, 2013).  
 190 See On-Site Reviews, CERTIFIED B CORP., http://bcorp.nonprofitsoapbox.com/become-a-b-corp/how-
to-become-a-b-corp/119 (last visited May 10, 2013). The results of the 2010 reviews can be found on the B 
Corporation website. The summary there reports:  
Twenty companies passed their on-site reviews, and two company reviews, Busboys & Poets and 
U.S. Tile, are still under review. As a result of the on-site review process, on average each 
company had its survey score adjusted upwards by 1.6 points or 1.6% of their total scores. 
Utilikilts, Institute of Green Professionals and Kings Counsel were also selected for on-site 
review but decertified prior to review. Vetrazzo was also selected for an onsite review, but was 
purchased by another company prior to the review. 
Id. 
 191 See Passing Legislation, CERTIFIED B CORP., http://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/legislation 
(last visited May 10, 2013). 
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enforcement architecture, perhaps a limited information-forcing role is 
sufficient to promote others to enter the market. Only experience will provide 
the answer to this question. 
It is important to recognize, however, that B Lab has found a market for its 
services outside of the legislative context. It offers B licensees access to group 
discounts and a potentially valuable mark for branding, even without being tied 
to a specialized form. B Lab also may be motivated by forces beyond its own 
financial success. After all, it is organized as a nonprofit, with a mission of 
“serv[ing] a global movement of entrepreneurs using the power of business to 
solve social and environmental problems.”192 B Lab explains its leadership on 
the legislative front as a service to its customers and this movement.193 Unless 
we are content to rely on this single, even if presumably altruistic, private 
regulator, we must consider whether other private regulators will enter the 
market to create third-party standards with only a limited information-forcing 
role. 
Of course, the goal is not merely to generate private regulators. Rather, 
these regulators must sufficiently produce or contribute to enforcement for 
specialized forms to succeed. Third parties in this role should admit only those 
social enterprises worthy of adopting a special form. If they are likewise 
empowered to adjudicate compliance over time, private regulators need to 
monitor and audit adopting entities and should revoke status when entities go 
astray. The most aggressive use of third-party regulators would also authorize 
them to impose penalties beyond revocation of status. Failure to exercise these 
gate-keeping functions responsibly raises the specter of greenwashing, or 
worse, corruption. Thus, this Article’s recommendations regarding the need to 
strengthen content requirements for third-party standards apply with even 
greater force if private regulators’ roles are expanded beyond information 
forcing. In addition, if a legislature delegates to private third parties the right to 
qualify entities for access to legal form or punish them for noncompliance, it 
also should provide for monitoring these delegees. Expecting investors and 
consumers to investigate and police their bona fides expects far too much. 
Finally, it must be recognized that casting private regulators as gatekeepers 
sets for them an extremely difficult job. Third-party certification schemes are 
 
 192 See The Nonprofit Behind B Corps, CERTIFIED B CORP., http://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-
corps/the-non-profit-behind-b-corps (last visited May 10, 2013). 
 193 See Passing Legislation, supra note 191 (describing B Lab’s leadership on benefit corporation 
legislation). 
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exceedingly difficult to get right because they have two important ingredients 
that are often in tension. On the one hand, they require a level of penetration 
and acceptance to have an impact; certification is valuable only if it is common 
enough that consumers of this information recognize it.194 Thus, gatekeepers 
cannot apply such onerous standards that few applicants make the cut, or 
nobody will know or care about certification anyway. On the other hand, they 
are only as good as the standards they enforce; certification is meaningless if it 
is so easily achieved that it is no mark of distinction.195 Gatekeeping private 
regulators must not apply such a weak screen that they certify too many 
applicants, or their stamps of approval will be well-known but little-valued. 
Threading this needle will be a challenge for B Lab and any new entrants 
specialized form legislation encourages to join the private regulatory market. 
Specialized forms can enlist third-party regulators as part of their 
enforcement architecture. Thus far, only the benefit entity forms have done so, 
and have endowed them with a limited information-forcing role. Future 
legislation can replicate this approach, or can cast private regulators in more 
fulsome information-forcing or direct-enforcement roles or both. In any case, 
private regulators’ contribution to enforcement will be determined by the 
content of the standards they apply and the energy and care with which they 
apply them. 
C. Conclusion 
Legislatures can select from among an expansive range of options to 
enforce social-good prioritization from within or outside social enterprises. 
Extant specialized forms already grant investors an assortment of 
informational, voting, and litigation rights. Legislatures could expand these or 
grant investors greater rights in management. Additional stakeholder groups, 
including employees, consumers, beneficiaries, and even the public more 
broadly, might also be tapped to enforce social-good prioritization. If resources 
should become available, public regulators might be tasked with enforcement 
as well. Or, legislation could seed a market for private regulators to do the job. 
For enforcement by any of these parties to help specialized forms achieve 
social mission, the law must impose a clear standard for them to enforce. Even 
with such a standard, however, serious obstacles will bedevil legislatures’ 
 
 194 See Brakman Reiser, supra note 90, at 60; Gugerty & Prakash, supra note 183, at 20. 
 195 See Brakman Reiser, supra note 90, at 60; Gugerty & Prakash, supra note 183, at 20. 
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attempts to provide potential enforcers with information relevant to judge 
compliance, effective enforcement tools, and incentives to act. 
IV.  BRANDING DIFFERENCE 
Ultimately, social entrepreneurs seeking specialized forms want these new 
forms to brand their enterprises as different. “Brands are sets of associations 
linked to a name or mark associated with a product or service,” or here, an 
entity.196 Social entrepreneurs want to create a brand for their individual 
enterprises, of course. But, in their search for specialized forms, they also 
desire this legal form to create a brand for any organization that inhabits it.197 
They want the specialized form, whether it be an L3C, benefit corporation, 
FPC, or some other new entrant, to identify adopting entities as “distinct.”198 
Social entrepreneurs wish to use specialized forms to convince contributors of 
capital to invest in their brand, employees to trust it, and the broader public to 
value it. This Part evaluates what role specialized forms can play in these 
efforts. 
Social entrepreneurs want specialized forms to identify their entities as 
meaningfully different from both traditional businesses and traditional 
charities, but still appeal to those who would contribute capital to both. Ideally, 
specialized forms would help them to attract equity capital from market 
investors as well as contributions from traditional charitable donors. Neither 
result, however, is likely. For market-rate investors purely interested in profits, 
an ownership interest in an entity adopting a specialized form that credibly 
commits it to pursue social good along with profit is simply no substitute for a 
share of a traditional for-profit.199 Without the incentive of tax deductibility, a 
 
 196 Tim Calkins, The Challenge of Branding, in KELLOGG ON BRANDING 1, 8 (Alice M. Tybout & Tim 
Calkins eds., 2005). 
 197 See LANG, supra note 123 (“Probably more importantly than anything else, the L3C is a brand . . . .”); 
Kelley, supra note 9, at 361–62 (discussing “[t]he [c]hallenge of ‘[b]randing’ [s]ocial [e]nterprises”). 
 198 Dictionary, AM. MARKETING ASS’N, http://www.marketingpower.com/_layouts/Dictionary.aspx?d 
Letter=B (last visited Sept. 25, 2012) (defining “brand”). 
 199 L3C advocates have asserted this form will encourage tranched investing, including a tranche 
attractive to market-rate investors. See Robert Lang & Elizabeth Carrott Minnigh, The L3C, History, Basic 
Construct, and Legal Framework, 35 VT. L. REV. 15, 17–18 (2010) (describing this technique and how it can 
provide “a market rate of return for market-rate investors”). In the words of the form’s principal proponent:  
[The L3C] facilitates layered investing with [foundation investors] usually taking first risk 
position thereby taking much of the risk out of the venture for other investors in more secure 
positions. . . . The rest of the investment levels become more attractive to commercial investment 
by improving the credit rating and thereby lowering the cost of capital. It is particularly favorable 
to equity investment. 
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donation to an entity adopting a specialized form is likewise not a substitute for 
one to a recognized charity. Thus far, specialized forms come with no tax 
benefits for contributors,200 and Congress is unlikely to extend such benefits in 
the near future.201 
Two groups of capital contributors can more likely straddle the middle of 
this divide. First, there are the mysterious and vaunted “socially responsible” 
or “impact investors,” who are willing to take a below-market return to achieve 
simultaneous social good with their invested funds.202 Such investors might be 
socially motivated venture capital firms or angel investors, as well as 
individuals and institutions (including mutual funds) that target companies 
pursuing both social good and profit for owners. Efforts to size this impact, or 
socially responsible investment market, value it in the billions or even trillions 
 
AMS. FOR CMTY. DEV., WHAT IS THE L3C? (2011), available at http://americansforcommunitydevelopment. 
org/downloads/What%20is%20the%20L3C%20080711-1.pdf; accord LANG, supra note 123. In my view, 
even without a clear and enforceable social-good prioritization mandate, market investors will be wary of the 
L3C’s mixed motives, especially if governance arrangements are structured to give foundation investors 
control. See Brakman Reiser, supra note 35, at 647–48. Others have argued this structure may breach the 
prohibitions on inurement or private benefit for foundations that might invest in L3Cs, see Bishop, supra note 
35, at 263–65, and that it may make L3Cs less attractive to “socially minded” mezzanine-tier investors. See 
Murray & Hwang, supra note 35, at 50–51; Usha Rodrigues, Entity and Identity, 60 EMORY L.J. 1257, 1317–
19 (2011).  
 200 Philadelphia has introduced an extremely limited tax benefit for which some social enterprises 
adopting specialized forms will qualify. See Credits, Grants & Other Incentives, BUS. SERVICES, https:// 
business.phila.gov/Pages/TaxCreditsOtherIncentives.aspx (last visited May 10, 2013) (providing $4000 tax 
credit to twenty-five sustainable businesses per year, and including certified B Corporations within eligible 
group); see also Anurag Gupta, Note, L3Cs and B Corps: New Corporate Forms Fertilizing the Field Between 
Traditional For-Profit and Nonprofit Corporations, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 203, 225 (2011) (reporting 
“rumor[s]” other municipalities will follow suit); Mark Hrywna, Benefit Corporation in California Meets Chill 
in San Francisco, NONPROFIT TIMES (Mar. 23, 2012), http://www.thenonprofittimes.com/article/detail/benefit-
corporation-in-california-meets-chill-in-san-francisco-4497 (describing opposition to a San Francisco measure 
under consideration to grant city contracting preferences to benefit corporations). 
 201 See supra notes 165–66 and accompanying text. 
 202 See Kelley, supra note 9, at 358 (“Social entrepreneurs view Socially Responsible Investing, or SRI, as 
a potential source of growth capital for the emerging fourth sector.”). Socially responsible investors 
“incorporate social criteria into their investment decisions.” Michael S. Knoll, Ethical Screening in Modern 
Financial Markets: The Conflicting Claims Underlying Socially Responsible Investment, 57 BUS. LAW. 681, 
681 (2002). Impact investors are typically defined as investing “to create positive impact alongside financial 
return,” J.P. MORGAN, INSIGHT INTO THE IMPACT INVESTMENT MARKET 2 (2011), though some use the term to 
denote investors who “seek a social return first and foremost.” Keren G. Raz, Toward an Improved Legal 
Form for Social Enterprise, 36 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 283, 294 (2012); accord Paul Sullivan, 
Philanthropists Weigh the Returns of Doing Good, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2012, at B5 (describing “impact 
investing” as “essentially investing money in an organization, either profit-making or nonprofit, with the 
expectation that it will generate a social benefit and perhaps a financial return”).  
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of dollars.203 Social enterprise is a complex and challenging concept, and the 
market for capital is brisk and competitive. If specialized forms can serve as an 
effective brand to reach this market, adopting such forms will be quite valuable 
indeed.204 
The puzzle about these investors is why they would not prefer to invest for 
a market rate of return and then make a tax-deductible donation of some 
portion of their return to a nonprofit charity pursuing their preferred social 
mission. One explanation is that such investors believe they can get different, 
better, and even more social good from a social enterprise pursuing social 
mission and profit together than from a nonprofit pursuing social good alone. 
This belief might be founded on the idea that the partial profit motive of a 
social enterprise leads to more efficient social-good production.205 Nonprofits 
are frequently charged with inefficiency and waste, in part due to their lack of 
investor principals who could hold fiduciary agents accountable.206 
Alternatively, or in combination, these investors might believe that social-good 
production by a social enterprise will be qualitatively different, perhaps being 
less influenced by elitism or cultural imperialism, which some charge has 
infected traditional philanthropy.207 Investors who view social enterprise’s 
 
 203 See HOPE CONSULTING, supra note 177, at 61 (finding a $120 billion market opportunity to increase 
impact investing); J.P. MORGAN, supra note 202, at 5 (reporting “[t]he 52 investors that responded to our 
online survey have indicated that they plan to invest a total of USD [$3.8 billion] in the 12 months following 
the survey”); MONITOR INST., INVESTING FOR SOCIAL & ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT: A DESIGN FOR 
CATALYZING AN EMERGING INDUSTRY 9 (2009), available at http://www.monitorinstitute.com/ 
impactinvesting/documents/InvestingforSocialandEnvImpact_FullReport_004.pdf (valuing the potential size 
of the impact investing market at $500 billion); SOC. INV. FORUM FOUND., REPORT ON SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE 
INVESTING TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES 8 (2010) (“At the start of 2010, professionally managed assets 
following SRI strategies stood at $3.07 trillion . . . .”); DAVID VOGEL, THE MARKET FOR VIRTUE: THE 
POTENTIAL AND LIMITS OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 60 (2005) (reporting that in 2003, $151 billion 
was under management with investment funds that screen companies for social impact). 
It is difficult to size the market for social enterprise investments specifically. Some of the estimates 
above include mutual funds that merely screen out certain investments deemed socially irresponsible by their 
investors, like tobacco or weaponry producers. These funds appeal to some investors’ desires not to fund 
production of products they abhor, but do not line up with social enterprise writ large and certainly not with 
entities adopting specialized forms. 
 204 It is also possible that investors will see specialized forms as a distinct disadvantage, merely because 
of their novelty. 
 205 See Dees & Anderson, supra note 7, at 5–6. 
 206 See, e.g., Katz & Page, supra note 128, at 95. 
 207 See, e.g., THE REVOLUTION WILL NOT BE FUNDED: BEYOND THE NON-PROFIT INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 
(INCITE! Women of Color Against Violence ed., 2007); Garry W. Jenkins, Nongovernmental Organizations 
and the Forces Against Them: Lessons of the Anti-NGO Movement, 37 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 459, 479–92 (2012) 
(describing the anti-NGO movement’s claims of NGO elitism and cultural imperialism, among other failings); 
Deborah M. Weissman, Law as Largess: Shifting Paradigms of Law for the Poor, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
737, 803–04 (2002) (“Philanthropies have engendered a sense of mistrust because of their concentration of 
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hybridity as part of its value will be looking for entities they can trust with 
their capital. Adopting a specialized form that indicates an enforceable 
commitment to prioritize social good might well draw in these investors and 
their funds. 
The other group of capital contributors social enterprises should try to 
reach might be called “quasi-donors.” Quasi-donors prefer to mix their 
donations toward a social good with product or service purchases. They make 
payments in which they expect to receive something less than full and fair 
consideration in return. They overpay in order to enable the recipient to 
dedicate some portion of its revenues to achieving their shared vision of social 
good. In a way, this is simply the other side of the coin of the impact investor, 
but the emphasis is on the donation, rather than the investment side. Sales 
revenue from pink products, yellow bracelets, and countless other cause-
related marketing efforts provide ample evidence consumers are willing to part 
with their funds on this category of expenditure.208 
A quasi-donation might be attractive for at least two reasons. A quasi-
donation may be a lesser risk than a pure donation, as a quasi-donor will 
receive some valuable item or service in return for her funds.209 In addition, 
like impact investors, quasi-donors may be convinced that the hybrid nature of 
social enterprise will produce more, better, or qualitatively different social 
good than will charities.210 Thus, they may prefer to make quasi-donations over 
unlinked donations and product purchases. For quasi-donors too, then, 
branding is key. To reach their funds, a social enterprise must convince quasi-
donors it offers this ideal, blended value. Specialized forms can also be part of 
this effort. 
As currently constituted, however, specialized forms provide very little 
branding value. One cannot create a brand for social enterprises through legal 
 
power and wealth, added to their ability to control valuable assets that might otherwise go to public coffers.”); 
Courtney Martin, The Future of Philanthropy, AM. PROSPECT (June 8, 2009), http://prospect.org/article/future-
philanthropy (describing groups challenging the perceived elitism of the nonprofit sector). 
 208 See Terri Lynn Helge, The Taxation of Cause-Related Marketing, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 883, 885 
(2010) (describing more than $1 billion in cause-related marketing revenues earned by charities in 2005). 
 209 Of course, tax deductibility can reduce the real cost of a pure donation to a qualifying charity. See 
I.R.C. § 170(c) (2006). As discussed, social enterprises will not qualify to receive tax-deductible contributions, 
and thus the difference in cost for a donation and quasi-donation may be closer than it would originally appear.  
 210 Quasi-donors may also desire to be seen as consumers of socially responsible or environmentally 
friendly goods. See generally FRAN HAWTHORNE, ETHICAL CHIC: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE COMPANIES WE 
THINK WE LOVE (2012) (describing this consumer preference and exploring whether the companies consumers 
presume to be ethical actually are). 
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forms without permitting them to express how different their enterprises are. 
But, this expressive function is essentially the only one current specialized 
forms serve. For a specialized form to credibly brand adopting entities as 
different, it must signal that these entities actually achieve both social good and 
profit objectives. Thus, for branding purposes too, specialized forms must 
impose a standard meaningfully distinguishing those adopting it from 
traditional nonprofits and for-profits. Social-good prioritization is that 
standard, but its adoption alone is still insufficient. To serve as an effective 
brand, a specialized form must also instill confidence that social-good 
prioritization will be enforced. Each of the potential enforcement mechanisms 
available faces serious obstacles. Future legislation must overcome these 
challenges, and both impose and enforce social-good prioritization for 
specialized forms to function effectively as brands. 
Of course, even if lawmakers take up the social-good prioritization 
standard and find enforceable methods by which to enforce it, a specialized 
form will only convey a fairly general message. It will communicate that an 
adopting social enterprise, on balance, prioritizes social good. Obtaining this 
level of brand messaging from a legal form of organization is an ambitious 
goal and it would be a significant achievement. But, the branding goals social 
entrepreneurs have for their entities do not stop there. They want to convince 
consumers to buy and beneficiaries to trust their different and better 
products.211 They want to attract and retain employees to their different and 
better jobs.212 They want to convince other companies, communities, and the 
public that they will be different and better partners for creating long-term 
economic and social value. In a crowded market of for-profits, nonprofits, and 
social enterprises, each social enterprise must persuade these audiences that the 
value proposition it offers is especially attractive. Social entrepreneurs and 
their advocates will need to be the driving force in their own branding efforts. 
And, they will need to do more than adopt a specialized legal form—even the 
most fully realized one—to convey their unique appeal to the numerous 
audiences they need to persuade. 
The fact that even powerful specialized forms are not alone sufficient to 
secure success does not detract from the value they can offer to social 
enterprise. Legal forms rarely serve as the single indicator of worth to all of the 
 
 211 See VOGEL, supra note 203, at 47–56 (analyzing whether consumers are moved by a producer’s 
commitment to pursuing social good). 
 212 See id. at 56–60 (evaluating whether and to what extent employees seek out employers based on their 
commitment to pursuing social good). 
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markets and stakeholders with whom an entity will interact. Social enterprises 
have many other available avenues to further distinguish themselves. They can 
use traditional marketing levers and novel advertising approaches to inform 
investors, consumers, and the public about what makes their social mission 
particularly compelling. To shore up these claims, they can invest in obtaining 
voluntary certifications of overall quality, like that offered by B Lab, or those 
available in their individual industry or geographic location.213 The law can do 
good work here. It should strive to improve specialized form legislation so that 
it does provide a brand for a new and different type of entity—one that 
prioritizes social mission but still distributes profits to owners. Social 
enterprises adopting these forms will need to take it from there and do the hard 
work of making their ventures a success. 
CONCLUSION 
Founders and proponents of social enterprise frustrated with the polar 
categories of nonprofit and for-profit form appear to have found 
accommodating audiences in state legislatures. A third of U.S. jurisdictions 
have approved legislation sanctioning L3Cs, benefit corporations, or FPCs, and 
more will almost certainly follow.214 Unfortunately, however, these enactments 
will only begin to address the goals social entrepreneurs have for specialized 
forms. These statutes permit social entrepreneurs to dedicate their entities to a 
very different model—one of doing both social good and profit. They fall 
short, however, of structuring organizations falling under them to ensure they 
actually will be different. This failing will prevent these specialized forms 
from functioning as effective brands. 
For specialized forms to achieve more, legislation adopting them should 
provide a clear standard requiring adopting entities to prioritize social good 
and must develop meaningful enforcement mechanisms. The social-good 
prioritization standard will be challenging to apply and will not answer every 
quandary a social enterprise faces. It will, however, usefully distinguish 
adopting entities from their traditional for-profit counterparts and will offer 
organizational leaders needed guidance in many difficult situations. Meeting 
the enforcement challenge will be more difficult. Whether legislation activates 
enforcement resources within or outside social enterprises, there will be 
 
 213 See, e.g., List of Standards, BENEFIT CORP. INFO. CENTER, http://www.benefitcorp.net/selecting-a-
third-party-standard/list-of-standards (last visited May 10, 2013) (listing a range of standards for assessing a 
company’s “sustainability practices”). 
 214 See supra note 31. 
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incentive problems, resource gaps, and market factors to overcome. Without 
offering some reliable means to enforce the meaningful difference a social-
good prioritization standard signifies, however, specialized forms will fail to 
steward social enterprises’ dual goals and will not develop into effective 
brands. 
 
